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ARTICLES
PLACEBO ETHICS: A STUDY IN SECURITIES
DISCLOSURE ARBITRAGE
Usha Rodrigues* and Mike Stegemoller**ENA CTED in response to abuses that led to Enron's fall, Section
406 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ("Sarbanes-Oxley" or
"SOX") effectively requires every public company to disclose its
code of ethics, and also to disclose immediately, via website or SEC
filing, any waivers from the code that the company grants to its top
three executives. These waivers offer a unique window not only into
the ethical practices of public U.S. companies, but also into how dis-
closure works "on the ground"-whether companies are actually
complying with disclosure rules.
Out of 200 randomly selected firms, we found only one waiver
filed over five years disclosed pursuant to Section 406. By exploiting
an overlap in disclosure regulations, we were able to crosscheck our
sample companies' waiver disclosures. We identified 33 instances in
which companies appear to have violated Section 406, and another
70 instances in which companies evaded illegality by watering down
their codes to such a degree that they no longer forbid the very En-
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ron-style conflicts of interest that led to the adoption of Section 406.
Finally, we studied all Section 406 waivers filed with the SEC in the
six years following SOX's passage-and found only 36 total. Event
studies revealed that the market generally did not react to these
transactions, suggesting that companies use waivers only to disclose
innocuous, immaterial information, and disclose more problematic
information, if at all, in more covert ways.
We draw two conclusions from our research. First, the current re-
gime is unhelpful and inefficient, long on costly and burdensome
disclosures, and short on demonstrable benefit. Section 406's disclo-
sure requirement is not functioning as intended. Either by mistake,
manipulation, or indifference, companies are evading its require-
ments. We suggest eliminating the currently unenforced code-of-
ethics waiver disclosure mandate, and instead requiring immediate
disclosure of related-party transactions involving the company's
CEO, CFO, or CAO, regardless of the firm's internal ethics rules.
Second, our study highlights the limited utility of regulation by man-
dated disclosure alone and the inadequacies of website disclosure for
securities regulation.
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INTRODUCTION
Responses to the recent financial crisis are legion and diverse,
but share a common theme: a desire for increased transparency. Of
all regulatory methods, disclosure is the most palatable. Sunlight,
that "best of disinfectants,"' and the market together work their
magic with no need for the imposition of substantive-and often
politically controversial-mandates on public companies. The ar-
gument goes that if commercial banks, investment banks, hedge
funds, and other private equity investors had actually known the
full extent of the derivatives market, of the collateral debt obliga-
tions, and of the credit default swaps, then the financial crisis might
have been avoided.
'See Louis D. Brandeis, Other People's Money and How the Bankers Use It 92
(1914) ("Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient
policeman.").
4 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 96:1
Yet respected market authority Warren Buffet has questioned
the value of transparency:
Improved "transparency"-a favorite remedy of politicians, com-
mentators and financial regulators for averting future train
wrecks-won't cure the problems that derivatives pose. I know
of no reporting mechanism that would come close to describing
and measuring the risks in a huge and complex portfolio of de-
rivatives. Auditors can't audit these contracts, and regulators
can't regulate them. When I read the pages of "disclosure" in 10-
Ks of companies that are entangled with these instruments, all I
end up knowing is that I don't know what is going on in their
portfolios (and then I reach for some aspirin).2
Though every publicly traded corporation in the United States
must theoretically comply with this country's mandatory disclosure
regime, the public has no way of knowing whether they actually do
so. Consequently, scholarly debate about securities laws focuses on
the contour of those regulations-and, sometimes, whether they
should exist at all. Some critics argue for stricter disclosure obliga-
tions to ensure a truly level playing field for all investors. Others
decry the costs and burdens of myriad mandatory disclosure re-
quirements, and advocate paring back. The most radical reformers
assert that market demands alone can sufficiently motivate compa-
nies to voluntarily disclose what is important, and therefore argue
for eliminating mandatory disclosure altogether.
All of these scholarly treatments, however, fail to evaluate a
matter of key importance in assessing the merits of disclosure re-
gimes: whether companies actually comply with current disclosure
laws. There is an easy explanation for this gap in the literature. Re-
searchers cannot measure the occurrence of nondisclosure because,
by definition, if an event is not disclosed, the information is not
public and therefore not measurable. And researchers are not
likely to elicit information about nondisclosure from company in-
siders because revealing the occurrence of such events would be
tantamount to confessing a crime.
'Letter from Warren Buffet, Chairman of the Board, to Shareholders of Berkshire
Hathaway Inc. (Feb. 27, 2009), available at http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/
letters/20081tr.pdf.
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We have discovered a rare, if not unique, opportunity to assess
the occurrence of corporate nondisclosures, which exists because
the law imposes overlapping disclosure requirements. Section 406
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002' ("Sarbanes-Oxley" or "SOX")
requires companies to disclose their codes of ethics (or explain why
they do not have them), and then to disclose any waivers from that
code granted to top corporate officers. Wholly apart from Section
406, Regulation S-K requires a disclosure of related-party transac-
4tions in companies' year-end proxy statements. Our research re-
veals that, at least for related-party transactions, firms regularly
engage in a kind of "disclosure arbitrage," neglecting to disclose
ethics waivers at the time when transactions occur (in violation of
Section 406 of Sarbanes-Oxley), but disclosing related-party trans-
actions in their year-end proxy statements as required by Item 404
of Regulation S-K. Section 406 was specifically designed to prevent
these kinds of related-party transactions, which contributed to En-
ron's demise. Our findings indicate, however, that current disclo-
sure regulations are neither preventing the targeted behavior nor
even revealing the types of activities that interest the marketplace.
This finding should give pause to those who would rely on either
transparency or a firm's own code of ethics as a tool for effective
regulation.
Our study involves three phases. First, we examine the codes of
ethics themselves to determine whether and how they are dis-
closed, as well as how accessible the disclosure is to the public. Our
main sample consists of 200 randomly selected firms.' In terms of
disclosure, Sarbanes-Oxley does not require a code of ethics, but if
a firm does not have one it must explain its absence. Unsurpris-
ingly, almost all firms choose to disclose a code rather than explain
why they do not have one. Ethics codes are relatively easy to find,
generally available via a corporation's website or its Form 10-K,
'Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 406(a)-(b), 116 Stat. 745, 789
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7264 (2006)).
'Thomas G. LaWer, Robert Kant & Steve Lapidus, A New Era of Executive Com-
pensation and Related Person Disclosure, in Practising Law Institute, Understanding
the Securities Laws 2009, at 397, 429 (2009).
'We use firms with historical stock price data on the Center for Research in Secu-
rity Prices database (CRSP). We randomly selected twenty firms from ten size-based
portfolios so that firm size was evenly distributed across all publicly-traded compa-
nies.
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the year-end report required by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC or "Commission"). In terms of disclosure of
codes of ethics themselves, then, the regulation appears to have
had its intended effect. However, because of the availability of
website disclosure, as companies are restructured or amend their
codes of ethics many codes are no longer available to the re-
searcher.
The second and third portions of our study focus on company-
granted waivers from the code of ethics. This research is greatly
complicated because Congress gave companies the option of web-
site disclosure rather than requiring disclosure on Form 8-Ks' filed
with the Commission.! Therefore, a study of 8-K filings alone can-
not provide a reliable list of all disclosed waivers. Only by looking
at both SEC filings and web-based disclosures can an exhaustive
list be made.
We began our study by looking at the filings of a random sample
of 200 firms from January 1, 2003,' through December 31, 2007, to
6 A firm's proxy statement can (and typically does) incorporate by reference much
of its 10-K. See Gerald T. Nowak, The Disclosure Cycle, in Practising Law Institute,
Securities Filings 2008, at 387, 397 (2008).
'Companies are required to file Form 8-Ks to update the market on specified
events that occur between the required quarterly filings. For example, if a company
enters into or terminates a material definitive agreement, files for bankruptcy, ac-
quires or disposes of a significant amount of assets, changes its accountant, or has a
director resign, it must file an 8-K with the SEC within four days of the event. See 17
C.F.R. § 249.308 (2009).
'The Act's language is actually somewhat ambiguous because it could be read sim-
ply to permit website disclosure. "The Commission shall... require the immediate
disclosure, by means of the filing of [a Form 8-K], dissemination by the Internet or by
other electronic means, by any issuer of any change in or waiver of the code of ethics
for senior financial officers." 15 U.S.C. § 7264(b) (2006). The SEC interpreted the
"or" to give corporations the option of different methods of disclosure, but it could be
read instead to give the SEC the option as to which method to require. The General
Instructions to Form 8-K read:
The registrant does not need to provide any information pursuant to this Item
5.05 if it discloses the required information on its Internet website within four
business days following the date of the amendment or waiver and the registrant
has disclosed in its most recently filed annual report its Internet address and in-
tention to provide disclosure in this manner.
Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Form 8-K: General Instructions 17 (2008), available at
http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form8-k.pdf. That excerpt, read in conjunction with
the Act's language, makes clear that the SEC gives the registrants the option.
'Although the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was enacted July 30, 2002, companies were only
required to comply with Section 406's code of ethics disclosure requirements and
[Vol. 96:16
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determine whether each firm disclosed its code and attendant waiv-
ers via website or 8-K. We then counted the number of ethics waiv-
ers filed via website or with the SEC. Our research revealed no
website waiver disclosure and only a single filing on a Form 8-K. In
other words, among 200 public companies over a five-year period
we found only one disclosure made under Section 406.0
Several hypotheses could explain why we found only one waiver:
(1) companies might be extremely ethical, and may not engage in
the kinds of transactions for which disclosure is required; (2) com-
panies that might otherwise engage in unethical conduct may be
dissuaded from such conduct by the prospect of SOX-required dis-
closure; (3) companies might not be preserving their website-
disclosed waivers for long;n or (4) undesirable insider-favoring
conduct may still be occurring, but is not being disclosed. The third
hypothesis highlights a serious problem for researchers and is why
we argue in Section V.B that the SEC should abandon its experi-
ment with wholly web-based securities disclosure. The fourth hy-
pothesis would be difficult to prove precisely because the required
disclosure is not being made-in these circumstances there is no
way for a researcher to know of undisclosed conduct because it is
undisclosed.
Fortunately, companies are required to disclose related-party
transactions once a year under separate SEC regulations. Although
amendment and waiver requirements in annual reports for fiscal years ending on or
after July 15, 2003. See Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002, Exchange Act Release No. 47,235, 68 Fed. Reg. 5110 (2003), re-
printed in [2002-2003 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) [ 86,818, at 86,883
(Jan. 23, 2003). Thus, 2003 represents only a partial year of data.
" The transitory nature of website disclosure makes it impossible to conclude that
no more disclosures actually occurred in the time period.
" Indeed, the SEC's instructions for Form 8-K require only that a company keep the
information on its website for "at least a 12-month period." Sec. & Exch. Comm'n,
Form 8-K: General Instructions 17 (2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/
about/forms/form8-k.pdf. As Section II.C will discuss, this instability of data is one of
the main drawbacks of sole website disclosure. One company's ethics code specifically
tracks the Form's language, requiring that a waiver be disclosed on the company web-
site "for at least a 12 month period." NBTY Inc., Code of Business Conduct and Eth-
ics, http://www.nbty.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=85635&p=irol-govConduct (last visited
Oct. 23, 2009). After that, the company must only "retain" the disclosure for at least
five years; that is, it can remove it from the website and store a record of it. Id. Nei-
ther the SEC's instructions nor the company's code discusses what value privately ar-
chiving past disclosure provides the public.
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Section 406 disclosure requirements differ from related-party-
transaction disclosure requirements, there is enough overlap for us
in the second part of our study to determine whether some waivers
required by Section 406 are not being filed. Sixteen of our sample
firms appeared to violate Section 406 by not disclosing transactions
as required a total of 33 times. Another 45 sample firms avoided
violating the Act in the strict sense, but only by watering down
their codes to an arguably illegal degree in 70 separate cases. As-
tonishingly, then, in a sample of 200 firms over a five-year period
we found a total of 103 instances in which companies' own public
filings indicated that they failed to make accurate-and arguably
required-disclosures. Over 7.5% of these 200 firms seemingly vio-
lated the law by participating in flawed disclosures.
One might object that there is no real problem with these viola-
tions of Section 406, since, even though the transactions in question
are not disclosed as ethics waivers, they are at least disclosed to the
market as related-party transactions. But disclosure of the transac-
tion via proxy statement can occur months after the transaction has
occurred, whereas Section 406 requires disclosure within four busi-
ness days. In addition, a disclosure via proxy can be "buried"
amongst the many other disclosures required in a company's year-
end filing.
In the third portion of our study, we observed all code of ethics
waivers disclosed via Form 8-K that were ever filed with the SEC
from 2002-2007 for any company, both inside and outside the 200
sample firms.12 From the effective date of Sarbanes-Oxley through
the endpoint of our study, we found only 36 waivers filed via Form
8-K. In other words, some 25,000 firm-years-based on an esti-
mated 5,000 public companies over our five-year study-produced
only 36 waivers filed via Form 8-K. We hypothesize that these van-
ishingly rare cases involve generally meaningless information. Only
the atypical firm chooses to disclose an ethics waiver at all, and we
postulate that before doing so the information has been vetted and
scrutinized to ensure it appears innocent.
" This data set does not comprise all waivers filed, however, because companies can
also file waivers on their websites. Nevertheless, given that we found no waiver disclo-
sure on the websites of the 200 sample companies, we presume this second data set of
all 8-K waivers filed with the SEC is fairly robust, though not exhaustive.
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We performed event studies for each 8-K, which allowed us to
measure the market's reaction to each individual waiver. No dis-
cernable change in the overall stock price of these companies oc-
curred, suggesting that waiver-disclosing firms reveal little of real
importance via waiver. What is more, there is evidence that firms
disclose more questionable transactions in a problematic way, bun-
dling ethics waivers with other information in the same Form 8-K.
It is possible that corporate managers intentionally use these bun-
dled disclosures to mask a particularly questionable transaction by
combining it with other information. We found that the market re-
acted negatively to such bundled disclosure-although it is impos-
sible to conclude whether the bundling strategy is not working or
whether the market reaction is not as negative as it would be were
the news not disguised by pairing it with other information.
Overall, our findings do not reveal companies that fail to dis-
close altogether-it would be impossible to detect total nondisclo-
sure. They do show, however, that firms do not make disclosures as
promptly and openly as Sarbanes-Oxley requires. There are two
ways to explain this outcome. According to a benign story, compa-
nies are accustomed to complying with related-party transactions
because regulations governing such disclosure have been in exis-
tence for decades. 3 Codes of ethics, in contrast, are of relatively re-
cent vintage, and firms may have no system in place to flag viola-
tions or waivers as they occur. If this benign story is true, two
conclusions follow. First, more training may be needed, or internal
controls may need to be tightened in order to ensure compliance.
Second, there is reason to believe that broader training and educa-
tion efforts must be undertaken whenever lawmakers put in place
new disclosure requirements.
The malign account is that companies are intentionally failing to
comply with the requirements governing ethics waivers because
regulators are unlikely to detect nondisclosure or pursue it if dis-
covered. Also, firms might have concluded that the market is not
"The current form of related-party transaction disclosure dates back to 1982, but
prior forms existed as early as 1942. See Disclosure of Certain Relationships and
Transactions Involving Management, Securities Act Release No. 6441, 47 Fed. Reg.
55,661-01 (1982), reprinted in [1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
83,281, at 85,534 (Dec. 12, 1982).
2010] 9
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familiar with disclosure that singles out these related-party transac-
tions as ethics waivers and therefore will react negatively to them.
The companies do disclose these transactions via the more stan-
dard and less transparent means of year-end proxy statements. We
posit that securities enforcement practices, coupled with the special
nature of proxy disclosure, explain why companies are willing to
disclose this information to the market eventually, although not in
the manner the law requires. The SEC is the sole enforcer of Sar-
banes-Oxley provisions and has abdicated the field with respect to
Section 406. Noncompliance with an unenforced provision may not
be surprising. Secondly, related-party disclosures can be delayed
and buried with a wealth of other information in proxy statements,
so they may appear less damaging.
It thus appears that Section 406 creates the worst of all worlds
for ethics: costly disclosure that lacks bite. Companies face the
burden of compliance with Section 406. Many firms fail to comply
with the disclosure requirements, and many others "comply" only
by impermissibly watering down their ethics codes. The handful of
disclosed waivers have little effect on the market, suggesting that
there is no meaningful disclosure of information. Worse yet, tooth-
less regulation may create a "placebo" effect under which regula-
tors and investors believe that Sarbanes-Oxley has imposed mean-
ingful ethical controls on companies, when in fact companies
operate free from real constraint.
We further conclude that disclosure is not always helpful, al-
though it might be the most politically palatable option. In particu-
lar, Section 406-style disclosure avoids hard regulatory choices by
essentially telling companies: "make up your own ethics rules, and
tell us when you break them." In contrast, companies appear more
inclined to comply with the "hard" disclosure required by Item
404's related-party transactions: "disclose all transactions with in-
siders over $120,000." Our findings show that "soft" disclosure is
ripe for mistake and manipulation. Section 406 also offers lessons
in the tremendous power the SEC exercises. Its discretion in de-
termining what laws to enforce shapes the reality of securities dis-
closure on the ground.
Soft disclosure requirements, coupled with under-enforcement,
combine to lull the market into a false sense of security by creating
the illusion of transparency and regulation. Both the SEC and the
[Vol. 96:110
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firms it supervises can point to ethics rules that exist on the books
as evidence of a commitment to appropriate behavior, but these so-
called ethics rules lack purchase in the real world. Any new reform
measures targeting increased transparency in the financial markets
should heed the troubling lessons learned from the implementation
of Section 406.
I. MANDATORY DISCLOSURE AND SECTION 406
A. Theories of Securities Disclosure
The stated mission of the SEC is to protect investors,14 and its
main tool is mandatory disclosure. As the SEC declares on its web-
site:
The laws and rules that govern the securities industry in the
United States derive from a simple and straightforward concept:
all investors, whether large institutions or private individuals,
should have access to certain basic facts about an investment
prior to buying it, and so long as they hold it. To achieve this, the
SEC requires public companies to disclose meaningful financial
and other information to the public. This provides a common
pool of knowledge for all investors to use to judge for themselves
whether to buy, sell, or hold a particular security. Only through
the steady flow of timely, comprehensive, and accurate informa-
tion can people make sound investment decisions."
The principle of mandatory disclosure-to ensure equal access
to information-is fundamental to our securities law. Even so,
scholars have long debated whether our mandatory disclosure sys-
tem is a net positive or negative. At times, calls for deregulation
have become strident." Critics decry the costs of collecting and
publishing information." Geoffrey Manne has suggested that dis-
14 Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, The Investor's Advocate: How the SEC Protects
Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation,
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Oct. 23, 2009).
Id. (emphasis added).
6 See, e.g., Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 Va. L. Rev. 1453, 1454
(1997).
" Recent complaints have centered on Sarbanes-Oxley's internal controls provision.
See Donald C. Langevoort, Internal Controls After Sarbanes-Oxley: Revisiting Cor-
2010] 11
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closure may also impose indirect costs, including avoiding other-
wise desirable activities that can only be pursued in secret.
Stephen Choi advocates the regulation of investors rather than
firms, so as to facilitate capital aggregation by freeing issuers from
oppressive regulation." Roberta Romano proposes allowing states
to offer disclosure regimes to compete with the federal govern-
ment's.20
On the other side, a few staunch supporters of our current sys-
tem of mandatory disclosure remain. Merritt Fox argues that the
mandatory disclosure of information creates positive externalities
for groups other than shareholders, such as suppliers and custom-
ers.21 Allen Ferrell advocates mandatory disclosure not only in the
United States, but also throughout the world, in an effort to equal-
ize international markets.22 Edward Rock claims that mandatory
disclosure creates a "credible commitment" to a certain permanent
level of disclosure because it is easy to become a public company
but difficult to exit from the system.23 Some mandatory disclosure
proponents damn it with faint praise: Paul Mahoney endorses
mandatory disclosure but calls for a paring back of disclosure re-
porate Law's "Duty of Care as Responsibility for Systems", 31 J. Corp. L. 949, 950
(2006); see also Robert Charles Clark, Corporate Governance Changes in the Wake
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: A Morality Tale for Policymakers Too, 22 Ga. St. U. L.
Rev. 251, 293 (2005) ("[T]he costs of section 404 are vastly higher than originally pre-
dicted by the SEC and lawmakers. At the time of SOX's enactment, the SEC esti-
mated compliance costs of $91,000 per company, or $1.24 billion in the aggregate. The
cost to companies in the [Financial Executives International] spring 2005 survey was
48 times the SEC average estimate, and the [American Electronics Association] tally
for American companies was 28 times the SEC aggregate estimate." (footnotes omit-
ted)).
18 Geoffrey A. Manne, The Hydraulic Theory of Disclosure Regulation and Other
Costs of Disclosure, 58 Ala. L. Rev. 473, 482 (2007).
" See Stephen Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers: A Market-Based Proposal,
88 Cal. L. Rev. 279,283 (2000).
"See Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities
Regulation, 107 Yale L.J. 2359, 2365 (1998).
21 See Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer
Choice is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 Va. L. Rev. 1335, 1345-46 (1999).
22 Allen Ferrell, The Case for Mandatory Disclosure in Securities Regulation
Around the World, 2 Brook. J. Corp. Fin. & Com. L. 81, 124-25 (2007).
23 Edward Rock, Securities Regulation as Lobster Trap: A Credible Commitment
Theory of Mandatory Disclosure, 23 Cardozo L. Rev. 675, 676 (2002).
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quirements on the theory that they reduce agency costs, even
though they have little effect on the accuracy of pricing.24
What both sides assume in this decades-long debate is that com-
panies comply with mandatory disclosure obligations. This assump-
tion is in a sense natural because it seems inevitable: there is no
way for researchers to detect whether companies are not comply-
ing with disclosure requirements. Or, put differently, nondisclosure
is impossible to measure. In a seminal article, Edmund Kitch de-
scribes how mandatory disclosure does not enhance accuracy be-
cause, by imposing liability for the production of misinformation, it
decreases the total amount of information produced.25 But he pre-
sumes that the mandatory disclosure regime works; that is, that the
required information is being produced, and that it is, on the
whole, accurate.
What if this assumption is wrong? How can we know whether
the required information is indeed being disclosed?26 Our study re-
veals that at least some information is not being disclosed as re-
quired-that information about high-level related-party transac-
tions, which should be disclosed almost immediately and
24Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 1047, 1047-48 (1995).
25 Edmund W. Kitch, The Theory and Practice of Securities Disclosure, 61 Brook. L.
Rev. 763, 771-72 (1995). Steven L. Schwarcz has made the opposite point, that the
problem may be the disclosure of too much information. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Re-
thinking the Disclosure Paradigm in a World of Complexity, 2004 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1, 5-6
(2004) ("In Enron, for example, there is no dispute that the existence of the SPE-
transactions was generally disclosed to Enron's investors. The disclosure itself, how-
ever, was ultimately said to be inadequate. Although this inadequacy might have been
intentionally fraudulent, the better explanation is that Enron's structured transactions
were so complex that disclosure either would have had to oversimplify the transac-
tions or else provide detail and sophistication beyond the level of both ordinary and
otherwise savvy institutional investors in Enron securities." (footnotes omitted)).
' Intelligent (and unscrupulous) issuers may be tempted not to make required dis-
closures; after all, who would be the wiser? Arrayed against such disclosure-defiance
are a variety of mechanisms that encourage honesty. First, firms and officers are liable
for misstatements and are subject to private lawsuits under Rule 10b-5 as well as civil
prosecution by the SEC or criminal prosecution by the Department of Justice. See 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2009). Second, under the Securities Act of 1933, underwriters and
accounting firms are also liable, although they have a "due diligence" defense if they
have taken reasonable measures to ascertain the truthfulness of the company's public
statements. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)-(b) (2006). Lack of enforcement by private right
of action, as we will see, coupled with non-enforcement by the SEC, can vitiate the
threat of liability.
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individually, instead is disclosed tardily and buried amidst other in-
formation. We are able to explore not only how the mandatory dis-
closure system works "on the ground," but also whether a particu-
lar disclosure provision did the work it was supposed to do. In the
next Section we turn to the history of this particular provision, Sec-
tion 406 of Sarbanes-Oxley.
B. The Road to Section 406
A chief mechanism for Enron's fraud was the use of special-
purpose entities headed by its Chief Financial Officer (CFO), An-
drew Fastow, to move liabilities off the company's balance sheet.
Enron's Code of Conduct specifically prohibited deals with related
parties,27 and ironically, the company hewed to its code of ethics.
Fastow disclosed the transactions to Enron's board of directors,
and the board duly waived its code and permitted the deals to go
forward.'
Against this backdrop, many commentators have attributed En-
ron's failure to its board of directors, which blithely consented to
deals that enriched Fastow and other employees by tens of millions
of dollars at the expense of Enron.29 Accordingly, a specific Sar-
banes-Oxley provision dealt with codes of ethics and waivers from
them.
The ethics code disclosure requirement, recommended by Sena-
tor Corzine, was adopted by the Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs without much debate.' The Senate
Committee observed:
The problems surrounding Enron Corp. and other public com-
panies raise concerns about the ethical standards of corporations
and their senior financial managers. The Committee believes that
7 Note, The Good, the Bad, and Their Corporate Codes of Ethics: Enron, Sarbanes-
Oxley, and the Problems with Legislating Good Behavior, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 2123,
2129 (2003) (noting that Enron's officers had failed to comply with many aspects of
Enron's code of ethics).
2 Madoka Mori, A Proposal to Revise the SEC Instructions for Reporting Waivers
of Corporate Codes of Ethics for Conflicts of Interest, 24 Yale J. on Reg. 293, 298-99
(2007).
29 Id.
30 Joshua A. Newberg, Corporate Codes of Ethics, Mandatory Disclosure, and the
Market for Ethical Conduct, 29 Vt. L. Rev. 253,274 (2005).
14 [Vol. 96:1
Placebo Ethics
investors have a legitimate interest in knowing whether a public
company holds its financial officers to certain ethical standards in
their financial dealings. The bill requires issuers to disclose
whether or not they have adopted a code of ethics for senior fi-
nancial officers and, if not, why not."
The waiver provision was later added to address the specific En-
ron problem of the board of directors granting waivers to the
CFO.32 Richard Breeden, a former Chairman of the SEC, suggested
disclosure of waivers of company ethics or conflicts codes and of
any conflict of interest involving a senior officer.33 The idea was
simple: the requirement of disclosure of ethics waivers would ei-
ther prevent such activity or reveal it to the market, which would
presumably react negatively.
Some have argued that Section 406 did not increase the risk of
liability for Enron-level fraud.' They claim that public companies
already have an overarching duty to disclose material information
to the market under Rule 10b-5, that the board's decisions to waive
the company's ethics code and permit Enron's transactions with its
CFO were material, and that disclosure was thus required under
pre-SOX law." Under this view, Section 406's only value would be
in signaling to investors in a highly focused way that something
ethically questionable was going on in the company. Whether one
3 See S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Public Company Ac-
counting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002, S. Rep. No. 107-205, at 32
(2002).
See Mori, supra note 28, at 299-300.
The Corporate and Auditing Accountability, Responsibility, and Transparency
Act of 2002: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 107th Cong. 473 (2002)
(statement of Richard C. Breeden, Chairman of the Sec. & Exch. Comm'n from 1989-
1993), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/medialpdfl040902rb.pdf.
' Joshua Newberg observes that Rule 10b-5 requires the disclosure of all material
facts, and that in retrospect the waivers themselves were material. Taking Enron as an
example, had Section 406 been in effect while the Enron board was granting waivers,
the question remains as to what disclosure would have been adequate. He adds, "In-
deed, if Enron had disclosed the waivers of its [code], but had not adequately detailed
the transactions, material omissions would still seem to exist despite any technical
compliance with § 406." Newberg, supra note 30, at 281-82.
" Id. at 282 ("Therefore it seems the significance of § 406 is that it will signal inter-
ested investors when an issuer grants waivers of its [code], not that it will provide any
meaningful additional grounds for liability in many cases."). If one views Rule 10b-5
as merely requiring disclosure of facts that would render statements not misleading,
then no independent liability would result.
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views Section 406's intended effect as minor or major, however, the
key question is the same: how well is Section 406's signaling func-
tion working? In Section III.C we attempt to answer that question,
but first we describe Section 406's requirements in greater detail.
C. The Requirements of Section 406
Congress and the SEC have to walk a fine line when legislating
and rulemaking in the corporate ethics sphere. Internal corporate
governance is a matter of state law, and state law has focused con-
siderable attention on related-party transactions.3 6 Delaware juris-
prudence, to take a notable state law example, evolved from a
nineteenth-century approach, declaring all transactions between a
corporation and its insiders voidable, to a more nuanced ap-
proach." Recognizing that transactions between corporation and
insider can sometimes be beneficial (as, for example, when a chief
executive officer (CEO) loans the corporation money on generous
terms), Section 144 of the Delaware code permits such transactions
as long as the material facts of the transaction are disclosed to and
approved by non-interested directors or shareholders, or the trans-
action is fair to the corporation."
SOX's ethics waiver provision, then, was seen as an incursion
into a traditional domain of state law." As a result, the law's ethics
requirement was couched, somewhat awkwardly, as a disclosure
mandate. SOX does not require a code of ethics, but it requires ei-
ther disclosure of any code a company adopts or an explanation of
why a company lacks one.
Section 406 requires the SEC to promulgate rules regarding dis-
closure of codes of ethics for senior financial officers.' Importantly,
" Z. Jill Barclift, Codes of Ethics and State Fiduciary Duties: Where is the Line?, 1
J. Bus. Entrepreneurship & L. 237, 250 (2008).
3 Usha Rodrigues, The Fetishization of Independence, 33 J. Corp. L. 447, 467
(2008).
3 Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 144 (2008).
39 See, e.g., Robert B. Thompson, Collaborative Corporate Governance: Listing
Standards, State Law, and Federal Regulation, 38 Wake Forest L. Rev. 961, 965-66
(2003).
4 Section 406 of SOX refers to a code that only applies to senior financial officers:
the "principal financial officer and comptroller or principal accounting officer," or in-
dividuals performing these functions. See 15 U.S.C. § 7264 (2006). The SEC rules
added the "principal executive officer," reasoning that CEOs should be held "'to at
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SOX directs the SEC to allow disclosure by Form 8-K, "the Inter-
net[,] or by other electronic means."4' Congress, however, gave no
direction as to how long such disclosure must remain on a com-
pany's website.
The SEC elaborated on the disclosure requirements of SOX.
The SEC's rules require that public corporations disclose whether
the company has adopted a code of ethics that applies to the CEO,
CFO, and controller or chief accounting officer (CAO).42 If the
corporation does not have such a code of ethics, it is required to
explain why not.43 A corporation wishing to disclose its code may
pursue three options: (1) include the code as an exhibit to the an-
nual report; (2) post the code of ethics on its website, having indi-
cated this intention in its annual report, along with the corpora-
tion's internet address; or (3) provide it to any person upon request
without charge." Thereafter, any amendments to the code, or
waivers of the code for specific transactions or matters involving
the three named officers, must be disclosed either on a Form 8-K
or, if the company has disclosed its intention to do so in its last an-
nual report, on its website.45 NYSE Euronext and the NASDAQ
have similar disclosure requirements for listed companies.'
least the same standards of ethical conduct' as senior financial officers." Newberg, su-
pra note 30, at 277 (quoting Disclosure Required by Sections 404, 406, and 407 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Securities Act Release No. 8177, 68 Fed. Reg. 5110, 5118
(2003), reprinted in [2002-2003 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $[ 86,818, at
86,895 (Jan. 23, 2003)).
4 15 U.S.C. § 7264 (2006).
42 See 17 C.F.R. § 229.406 (2008).
43 Id. Newberg did not find a single instance of corporations electing not to disclose
a code of ethics and providing an explanation why not. See Newberg, supra note 30, at
285 n.170. The findings in our sample are consistent with this result, but there are two
cases of companies, both struggling economically, that do not disclose a code and of-
fer no explanation for nondisclosure, in violation of the rule. See Table II, infra, Dis-
closure Methods for Codes of Ethics.
" See 17 C.F.R § 229.406 (2008).
45 Id,
* The NYSE requires listed companies to adopt and disclose a code of business
conduct and ethics for directors, officers, and employees, and to "promptly disclose
any waivers of the code for directors or executive officers." NYSE Inc., Listed Com-
pany Manual § 303A.10 (2009), available at http://nysemanual.nyse.com (emphasis
added). The NASDAQ merely requires that listed companies adopt a code of conduct
that complies with the requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley and SEC regulations.
NASDAQ Inc., NASDAQ Manual Rule 4350(n) (2006). Some of our sample compa-
nies violated the NYSE rule by not disclosing a waiver granted to officers like the
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The results of this regulatory regime have been underwhelming,
to say the least. Waivers have received little attention in the busi-
ness press or in legal and economic scholarship. A LexisNexis
search47 revealed a single Business Wire story making reference to a
waiver, reporting a company press release stating that a director of
Patterson Companies, Inc. would resign from the board rather than
seek a waiver from the company's code of ethics after his firm in-
vested in a Patterson supplier.' The article praises the decision as a
commitment to the values and ethics of the corporation. Indeed, it
is not even, strictly speaking, a "waiver" story, but rather a story on
action taken to avoid the need for a waiver from the company's
code.
D. Prior Ethics Waiver Literature
Scant literature exists regarding waivers of ethics codes, and
most of it merely speculates on Section 406's effects. Corporate
ethics codes generally have been criticized as mere "window-
dressing."49 Several studies appear to cast doubt on these codes'
ability to change employee behavior."o Along with the generalized
fear that ethics codes are ineffectual, there is a more specific con-
cern that the disclosure requirements of SOX have had the unin-
tended effect of causing corporations to weaken their ethics
codes."
chief operating officer, but we did not track violations of exchange rules, only of Sar-
banes-Oxley.
4 We searched the LexisNexis Academic database for news announcements from
"U.S. Newspapers & Wires" for the following two terms: "waiver" and "code of eth-
ics." There were seventy-eight search results, of which only one was a company's
granting a waiver of the firm's code of ethics.
"Patterson Companies Reports Change in Board of Directors, Business Wire, July
29, 2005.
4 See, e.g., Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negoti-
ated Governance, 81 Wash. U. L.Q. 487, 487 (2003); Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Gros-
kaufmanis, Minimizing Corporate Civil and Criminal Liability: A Second Look at
Corporate Codes of Conduct, 78 Geo. L.J. 1559, 1630-31 (1990).
'0 Krawiec, supra note 49, at 511 ("Despite the pervasiveness of ethics codes in cor-
porate America and the insistence by many legal compliance professionals on their
importance as a deterrence tool, little evidence exists to support the theory that ethics
codes modify employee behavior."). Krawiec observes that the studies finding a sig-
nificant relationship between ethics codes and employee behavior have methodologi-
cal flaws. Id.
" See Note, supra note 27, at 2135-36.
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Soon after SOX's passage, there was speculation that the law's
disclosure mandate would increase the chances that companies
would soften the language of their codes, constricting the universe
of prohibition so that there would be less exposure for failure to
reveal a waiver.52 Indeed, a Practising Law Institute (PLI) publica
tion counsels that "the less frequently a [c]ompany needs to grant
waivers, the better."" After all, having a code in place and failing
to enforce it may well be worse than having no code at all, because
management may be seen as openly flouting its own rules.54 For ex-
ample, Wal-Mart, a corporation famous for its strict code of ethics,
fired marketing executive Julie Roehm for having a personal rela-
tionship with a subordinate and receiving gifts, "including liquor
and lavish dinners," from suppliers." She responded by suing the
company, claiming that it applied a double standard and that Wal-
Mart's top executives had also received gifts from vendors." Com-
panies might well conclude that a weaker code of ethics would lead
to less liability. In short, Section 406 have a perverse effect: instead
of increasing transparency, it may encourage firms to rewrite codes
of ethics to minimize the need for any disclosure at all."
52 Id. at 2137-38 ("In light of the new disclosure requirements, general counsel may
advise the boards of public companies to draft very narrow codes to avoid ever having
any waivers to disclose. The aversion to public disclosure stems from the concern that
shareholders and regulators will not give due consideration to the beneficial aspects
of otherwise prohibited activities that receive waivers, and consequently, that well-
informed decisions to grant waivers will be perceived negatively in the market and,
even worse, second-guessed in litigation when hindsight proves those business deci-
sions to be poor ones." (footnotes omitted)); see also Manne, supra note 18, at 488.
53 Russell J. Bruemmer & Leslie Sturtevant, The Influence of Corporate Govern-
ance and Codes of Conduct on Effective Compliance Programs, in 2 Corporate Com-
pliance Institute 2004, at 129, 147 (Karen S. Guarino et al. eds., 2004). The authors do
go on to note that "the code of ethics should not be drafted solely with minimizing
waivers in mind, or the code may risk running afoul of the SEC, NYSE, and
NASDAQ substantive requirements." Id.
54 Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 49, at 1643.
" James Bandler & Gary McWilliams, Wal-Mart Chief Bought Ring from Firm's
Vendor, Wall St. J., May 30, 2007, at A4. "'Instead of working solely in Wal-Mart's
interest,' [Ms. Roehm] 'frequently put her own first. She did not merely fail to avoid
conflicts of interest, she invited them,"' according to Wal-Mart's court filings. Louise
Story & Michael Barbaro, Wal-Mart Fights Back over Firings, N.Y. Times, Mar. 20,
2007, at C1 (quoting Wal-Mart's court filings).
"Bandler & McWilliams, supra note 55, at A4.
"See Manne, supra note 18, at 488; Note, supra note 27, at 2140. ("Companies will
include only the bare minimum needed to comply with the SEC's suggested topics for
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Until now, almost no empirical work has been done on the effect
of these ethics requirements-neither on disclosure of the codes
themselves, nor on waivers granted from the codes. A single study
in 2006 limited itself to waivers filed with the SEC and did not ex-
plore the possibility of cross-checking with related-party transac-
tions." One of us undertook a limited investigation of waivers filed
via 8-K, and this study grew out of that preliminary work.59
II. RANDOM SAMPLE
A. Methodology
We examined a sample of firms covered by the Center for Re-
search in Security Prices database (CRSP). From CRSP, we
formed ten portfolios of firms based on each firm's market value of
equity-the product of the price of the firm's common stock and its
shares of common stock outstanding-as of December 2003, the
end of the first full year of SOX. We then randomly selected
twenty firms from each of the size deciles so that firm size was
evenly distributed across all publicly traded companies.
Table I shows the mean and median market value of equity for
each decile. Decile one has an average market value of equity of $5
million, and decile ten has an average market value of equity of
approximately $11.4 billion.
a code, and the public filing of codes will not matter because investors will be unable
to distinguish one vague, boilerplate code from another.").
'See Mori, supra note 28, at 304-05.
" See Usha Rodrigues, From Loyalty to Conflict: Addressing Fiduciary Duty at the
Officer Level, 61 Fla. L. Rev. 1, 1-2 (2009).
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Table I. Market Value of Equity of Random Sample
This table is arranged by decile, sorted from smallest (1) to larg-
est (10). The number of observations within each decile is in the
last column. The numbers in the middle two columns are in mil-
lions of dollars.
Dec*le Mean Median Obs.($ mil) ($ mil)
1 5.0 4.6 20
2 17.3 17.5 20
3 31.6 32.8 20
4 61.0 63.4 20
5 89.7 90.6 20
6 185.1 192.3 20
7 331.9 318.1 20
8 642.0 623.4 20
9 1,567.5 1,467.0 20
10 11,382.1 8,027.5 20
Within each decile there is little industry concentration. There
are only two deciles in which there are five firms with the same
two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code: decile six
has five firms in the depository institutions industry (SIC code 60),
and decile eight has five firms in the business services industry (SIC
code 73), which is a diverse industry containing disparate fields
ranging from advertising services to medical equipment leasing.'
Considering the sample's three largest industries, we find that
12.5% (25) of sample firms are depository institutions, 9.5% (19)
* Standard Industrial Classification codes are four-digit numerical codes assigned by
the U.S. government to business establishments to identify their primary business.
The classification was developed to facilitate the collection, presentation, and analysis
of data; and to promote uniformity and comparability in the presentation of statistical
data collected by various agencies of the federal government, state agencies, and pri-
vate organizations. NAICS and SIC Codes, http://www.library.ilstu.edu/page/73 (last
visited Oct. 29, 2009).
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are in the business services industry, and 8.5% (17) are in the
chemical and allied products industry.
B. Code Disclosure
Having identified 200 sample firms, we began our study by ex-
amining the disclosure of codes of ethics. We studied whether
companies choose to disclose their codes of ethics, the method of
disclosure, and how easy it would be for an interested investor to
find the code.
1. Compliance
a. Presence of Code
We found that most companies-all but 31 of the 200 sample
firms-disclose their codes of ethics. In Panel B of Table II, we de-
scribe the 31 firms for which we could not locate a code. Ten com-
panies state that their code of ethics is on their website, but we
were unable to locate it there. In nine cases, we found through
news sources that the firm either failed or filed for bankruptcy.
These companies did not have a working website and are not listed
on any exchanges. Five of the firms were involved in a merger, and
the surviving firm was significantly different from the firm we ini-
tially identified. Two companies reincorporated under a new name.
Of the remaining companies, three firms went private and, there-
fore, the regulations pertaining to publicly filed companies no
longer applied to them. Three remained publicly listed on the ex-
change, but did not have codes of ethics. According to EDGAR,
one of these three companies has never made any filings with the
SEC, while a second has not filed in more than a year.
b. Method of Disclosure
In Panel A of Table II, we show the ways by which companies
make their codes of ethics available to investors. The most onerous
disclosure mechanism involves writing to the company's secretary
to request a copy of the code. Only five companies in our sample
require a written request.
Thirty-three (17%) of our sample firms include a copy of the
code of ethics on Form 10-K (a company's year-end filing, often in-
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corporated in its annual report), rather than posting it to the web-
site. We presume that placing the code of ethics in the 10-K makes
it less accessible for investors than posting the code on the com-
pany website. If 10-Ks are the mode of disclosure, investors must
either find the forms on EDGAR, the SEC's public access data-
base containing company financial information, or rely on com-
pany websites that list SEC filings (for example, by navigating to a
firm's "investor relations" page and clicking on "SEC filings"). Ei-
ther way, an investor must have enough knowledge of securities fil-
ings to know to search for 10-Ks out of the alpha-numeric soup of
SEC forms (8-Ks, 10-0, 14-A, etc.). Thirty-three companies chose
to include the code of ethics in their 10-K, 20-F or 40-F."
Almost 66% (131) of the firms in our sample chose to post their
code of ethics on their websites, and these firms usually disclose in
the 10-K that the code is posted in this way. Eleven companies pro-
vide a direct URL to the site where the code is located.
6 There was one disclosure made via 20-F and one disclosure made via 40-F. These
are annual report equivalents for foreign private issuers.
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Table II. Disclosure Methods for Codes of Ethics
Description Number of % of TotalObservations
Panel A. Disclosure Method
Website 131 65.5%
No Code of Ethics 21 10.5%
10-K, 20-F, 40-F 33 16.5%
False Assertion of Disclosure 10 5%
Could Not Find Code on Web
Request Sent to Company 5 2.5%Secretary
Total 200 100%
Panel B. Missing Codes
(No Code or False Assertion of
Disclosure)
False Assertion of Disclosure:
Could Not Find Code on Web
Failed or Disappeared 9 29%
Merged 5 16%
Still Publicly Listed 3 10%
Stock De-listed 2 6.5%
Reincorporated 2 6.5%
Total 31 100%
2. Ease of Discovery
In this Subsection, we consider two quantifications of how diffi-
cult it would be to locate a company's code of ethics: 1) the number
of documents an investor must navigate and 2) the number of
clicks required to find the code.
a. From Document to Document
First, we examined the number of documents an investor must
navigate to find a firm's code of ethics. Each document that an in-
vestor must view in order to get to the code of ethics is counted as
a single "step." Because the required initial disclosure is in Form
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10-K, we began there.62 There was only one step if the company
disclosed its code of ethics directly in the 10-K. When the 10-K re-
ferred the user directly to the website where the code of ethics was
located, finding the code took two steps. Similarly, if the 10-K re-
ferred investors to the proxy statement, which contained the code,
two steps were required. Finally, in some instances the 10-K re-
ferred the user to a proxy statement, which then directed the user
to the company website for a copy of the code of ethics, a total of
three steps. A large majority of codes, some 79%, could be found
in two steps or less.
Table IH. Overall Ease of Discovery of Ethics Codes
Number of Steps Number of Companies % of Total
to Find Ethics Code
1 33 20%
2 96 59%
3 35 21%
Total 1646 100%
b. From Click to Click
Successful navigation to a company's website may not end the
search for the company's ethics code. A company may "bury" its
code within the website, requiring investors to navigate through
several pages before finally finding the code itself. To measure this
complexity, each webpage that an investor navigates in order to
view the code of ethics is counted as a single "click."' Table IV
62 The SEC's requirement that companies disclose their disclosure method in the 10-
K presumes that investors start with the 10-K in their quest to find a company's code
of ethics. Ethics-minded investors arguably would be more likely to start with the
company's website, and this method of discovery is discussed below, in Subsection
II.A.2.b.
"The total of 164 is derived by subtracting from the original 200 the 21 companies
that have no code, the 10 companies for which a code ultimately could not be located,
and the 5 companies that require individuals to write to the company secretary in or-
der to receive the code.
" We presume that an investor interested in a company's code of ethics would know
to click on a link titled "Investor Relations" (or something similar) and then on "Cor-
porate Governance," "Ethics," or a similar link. Of course, an extremely ethics-
minded investor could avoid the multiple clicks by simply performing a Google search
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summarizes the data we collected on ease of access to website-
disclosed codes.
Table IV. Ease of Discovery for Website Disclosed Codes
Number of Clicks Number of Companies % of Total
to Find Ethics Code
1 4 3.1%
2 27 20.8%
3 64 49.2%
4 18 13.8%
5 4 3.1%
6 2 1.5%
7 1 0.8%
No code found 10 7.7%
Total 1306 100%
As Table IV reveals, we found that almost all companies disclose
codes, and they are generally easy to find, although a sizable mi-
nority (19%) required four or more steps. Arguably the most trou-
bling of our findings was that we failed to locate the codes of ethics
of ten companies, notwithstanding the companies' assertions that
their codes had been disclosed. In these cases, the company may
receive some benefit from claiming to have a code of ethics, even
though no investor will ever see it.
C. The Website Problem
Before turning to the subject of waivers, we pause to flag the
special problems that website disclosure causes for our study.
Normally companies make filings with the SEC, which are imme-
for a company's name, coupled with "code of ethics." Our methodology aims to rec-
reate the browsing of an investor interested in researching a company and exploring
its website by clicking through various investor relations materials, but not so focused
on ethics that "company name" plus "ethics code" would be the initial search term.
6 This number adds up to one fewer than the total number of companies that dis-
closed via website because one company's code of ethics could only be found by
searching "backyard burger conduct code" on an internet search engine. This search
took one directly to a PDF containing the code of conduct.
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diately available for electronic research via the SEC's EDGAR da-
tabase. While the web likewise provides immediate disclosure,
EDGAR archives these disclosures, preserving them for investors,
analysts, and researchers in an easily accessible format. Commer-
cial services like 10-K Wizard and LiveEdgar also offer sophisti-
cated searching capabilities at a modest price.
In contrast, internet disclosure is unpredictable and ephemeral.
The vagaries of corporate existence mean that many smaller public
companies fail or are acquired, taking with them their websites and
their codes of ethics. As we discuss in the next Part, waivers pose
even more complicated opportunities for gaming the system. In
fact, the SEC's Form 8-K instructions only require that a company
maintain waiver information on its website for twelve months."
Because of these problems, we advocate in Section V.B concurrent
EDGAR and website disclosure.
III. SAMPLE WAIVERS
In this Part, we move to the heart of our findings: the disclosure
of waivers from the codes of ethics. We first examine the means of
waiver disclosure, and then discuss the lone waiver we found for
the 200 sample firms over the five surveyed years. We then exam-
ine all the related-party transactions that the 200 sample firms re-
ported in their year-end proxy statements and crosscheck to see
whether these firms fail to report waivers when required to do so.
We close by discussing the unusual case of three Viacom waivers
that, although not a part of our sample, raise important issues re-
garding the operation of Section 406.
A. Means of Disclosure
Along with disclosing their code of ethics, companies must indi-
cate how waivers of the code will be disclosed. Ninety-two of the
200 companies, or 46% of the sample, indicate that ethics waivers
will be made on their website. Three companies indicate that they
will disclose waivers via Form 8-K.67 Forty-six companies, or 23%
" Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Form 8-K: General Instructions 17 (2008), available at
http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form8-k.pdf.
None of these companies, however, chose to set out their code of ethics in their
10-Ks.
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of the sample, do not specify a means of disclosure, but the SEC's
rules require affirmative disclosure of an intention to disclose
waivers on a website, so silence signals a commitment to use the
SEC form, the 8-K.6' Twenty-one companies did not publish a code
of ethics, so we categorize their disclosure method as "not applica-
ble." The remaining 38 companies simply state that disclosure will
be made by "some approved means," without indicating further
what means they will use. This last set of companies create a spe-
cial risk of confusion for investors, who are left facing the possibil-
ity that the firm will use 8-Ks, the company website, or some other
undefined disclosure mechanism that might be "approved"-either
by the SEC, by the relevant stock exchange, or perhaps even by the
company itself.
Table V summarizes the data we gathered regarding the chosen
means of waiver disclosure.
Table V. Disclosure of Waivers
Number
of Companies
Disclosure via Website 92 46%
8-K 3 1.5%
Silent 46 23%
Not Applicable 21 10.5%
Some Approved Means 38 19%
Total 200 100%
B. Single Disclosed Waiver
Of our sample of 200 companies over five years, we found evi-
dence of only one waiver disclosure. BioTime, Inc., a biotechnol-
6 See 17 C.F.R. § 229.406(d) (2008) ("If the [corporation] intends to satisfy the dis-
closure requirement under Item 10 of Form 8-K regarding an amendment to, or a
waiver from, a provision of its code of ethics that applies to the [corporation's] princi-
pal executive officer, principal financial officer, principal accounting officer or con-
troller, or persons performing similar functions and that relates to any element of the
code of ethics definition enumerated in paragraph (b) of this Item by posting such in-
formation on its Internet website, [the corporation must] disclose [its] Internet ad-
dress and such intention.").
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ogy firm, disclosed a waiver on October 10, 2007, in a Form 8-K
filed with the SEC.69 BioTime's CEO, Dr. Michael West, had re-
cently been hired from his position as President and Chief Scien-
tific Officer at Advanced Cell Technology, a "potential" competi-
tor of BioTime. BioTime's code of ethics prohibited its employees
from holding a financial interest in or consulting with a competitor.
The BioTime board granted a waiver to allow Dr. West to consult
for Advanced Cell Technology and serve on its board through the
end of the year. In addition, it allowed him to hold common stock
and stock options in Advanced Cell Technology.
In our view, this sample waiver is relatively innocuous and far
removed from the corporate misbehavior that brought about En-
ron's downfall. If a company hires an officer from within its indus-
try, it is to be expected that it might look to a competitor or "po-
tential competitor," and that the hired officer might have stock or
options in his or her ex-employer. To be sure, the BioTime waiver
also authorized continued consulting and board service for the po-
tentially competing firm. The permitted service for "two masters,"
however, lasted only three months and was understandable as a
transition device.
C. Compliance Assessment: Related-Party Transactions
There are several explanations for the absence of waiver disclo-
sure in our sample. First, companies might be extremely ethical,
and may not engage in the kinds of transactions that require disclo-
sure. Second, companies that might otherwise engage in unethical
conduct may be dissuaded from such conduct by the prospect of
SOX-mandated disclosure. Third, companies may not be preserv-
ing website waivers long enough for us to detect them; indeed, the
SEC only requires waiver publication via website for twelve
6 The full text of the waiver states:
BioTime's Code of Ethics states that employees should not provide consulting
services to a competitor or hold a financial interest in a competitor. BioTime
has granted Dr. West [CEO] a waiver from that provision of its Code of Ethics
with respect to the Advanced Cell Technology, Inc. common stock and stock
options he owns. Dr. West may also provide certain consulting services to his
former employer and to [sic] remain on its board of directors until December
31, 2007. Advanced Cell Technology, Inc. is a potential competitor of BioTime
in [the] field of regenerative medicine and stem cell technology.
Biotime, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 5 (Oct. 10, 2007).
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months, so that waivers in the first three years of the study might
have been legitimately removed from public view." Finally, the un-
desirable conduct still may be occurring, while simply not being
disclosed as required by Section 406. This last possibility is difficult
to prove precisely because the required disclosure is not being
made.
The overlap of different securities disclosure regulations, how-
ever, creates an alternative way to measure compliance with Sec-
tion 406's disclosure requirements. Item 404 of Regulation S-K re-
quires disclosure in a company's 10-K of any transaction or
proposed transaction in which the corporation "was or is to be a
participant and the amount involved exceeds . .. $120,000 ... and
in which any related person had or will have a direct or indirect
material interest."7 2 "Related persons" are defined as: (a) a corpo-
ration's current or nominated directors and executive officers, and
their immediate family;" or (b) a person or group known to be the
beneficial owner of more than 5% of the corporation's voting secu-
rities, or their immediate family.74 Related-party transactions must
be disclosed annually in a company's 10-K or its proxy state-
ment"-in contrast to waivers of a company's code of ethics under
" One inherent weakness of our study is, of course, the transient nature of website
disclosure. We studied the disclosures companies made or should have made one to
five years in the past. While filings with the SEC create a permanent archive, website
disclosure is ephemeral. Thus, some of our violations might have been properly dis-
closed via website, but permissibly removed after twelve months. Still, we conducted
our study in the summer of 2008; presumably, if companies were appropriately dis-
closing waivers, we would have found at least some from 2007 and early 2008. The
fact that we found none, coupled with the fact that only 45% of our sample opted for
website disclosure at all, leads us to conclude that noncompliance is probably com-
mon.
" Item 13 of Form 10-K requires compliance with Item 404 of Regulation S-K. Sec.
& Exch. Comm'n, Form 10-K: General Instructions 11 (2009), available at
http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/forml0-k.pdf.
See SEC Item 404, 17 C.F.R. § 228.404 (2008).
" "Immediate family" is defined as "any child, stepchild, parent, stepparent, spouse,
sibling, mother-in-law, father-in-law, son-in-law, daughter-in-law, brother-in-law, or
sister-in-law of such director, executive officer or nominee for director, and any per-
son (other than a tenant or employee) sharing the household of such director, execu-
tive officer or nominee for director." Id.
" See Instructions to SEC Item 403, 17 C.F.R. § 228.403 (2008); SEC Item 404, 17
C.F.R. § 228.404(a) (2008).
" Securities law allows a firm's Form 10-K to incorporate by reference its definitive
proxy statement, if such statements are filed with the Commission within 120 days af-
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Section 406, which must be disclosed within four business days on a
Form 8-K or on the company's website."
The fit is not perfect. Section 406 and Item 404 differ with regard
to the individuals covered, and the amount and nature of transac-
tions to be disclosed. Even so, the overlap is substantial. Codes of
ethics generally should ban related-party transactions with senior
officers (although, as we note in Subsection III.C.2, not all do).
Item 404 applies to all related-party transactions over $120,000 be-
tween the corporation and a relatively large set of corporate insid-
ers. Section 406 targets senior financial officers (the CEO, CFO,
CAO, or officers performing similar duties), and each of these per-
sons is clearly a corporate "executive officer" for purposes of
Regulation S-K. Given this commonality of coverage, we reviewed
all reported related-party transactions for the sample companies
from 2003-2007. We then pulled out and analyzed the subset of
transactions involving Section 406 level officers. We compared
them with the reported codes of ethics for the sample companies.
With one exception, we found no evidence that any of these transac-
tions were disclosed as a waiver, even when Section 406 clearly re-
quired disclosure. See Figure 1.
ter the end of the fiscal year covered by the registrant's Form 10-K. Most of the re-
lated-party transactions we found were, in fact, reported in proxy statements. See
Nowak, supra note 6, at 409 ("Part III of Form 10-K is essentially parallel to the proxy
statement disclosure required by Regulation 14A. Accordingly, such information may
be incorporated by reference to the registrant's definitive proxy or information state-
ment involving the election of directors.").
"See 17 C.F.R. § 249.308 (2008); Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Form 8-K: General In-
structions 2 (2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form8-k.pdf.
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Figure 1
1. Actual Violations
Out of 200 sample companies, 16 companies appear to have vio-
lated SOX." The total number of actual violations for all compa-
nies was 33. The number of actual violations is as follows:
7 Sometimes firms disclose related-party transactions that occurred in prior years.
Therefore, a single transaction might be disclosed on three successive proxy state-
ments. We have counted a single transaction as one violation of Section 406, on the
theory that Section 406 is a one-time disclosure requirement. If the transaction is "on-
going" (that is, a multi-year loan or an interlocking director position), however, we do
not treat each subsequent disclosure as another violation. In other words, we presume
that Section 406 is focused on getting information to the market quickly and Item 404
is more focused on providing a snapshot of the related-party transactions in which a
company currently engages.
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Table VI. Actual Violations
Type of Transaction Number of Transactions
Asset Sales 6
Family Hires 9
Leases 5
Loans 6
Other 2
Services 5
Total 33
"Asset sales" occur when the company purchases assets from an
officer or an entity controlled by an officer, or when an officer or
an entity controlled by an officer makes a purchase from the com-
pany. These sales present problems because of the conflict of inter-
est that arises in determining the terms of the sale. In one example
of an asset sale, the company purchased a London condo from its
CEO for $12.5 million.
"Family hires" occur when a company hires a member of an offi-
cer's family for a position within the company or the company uses
a family member's services. These hires present conflicts because
the terms of the employment agreement may seem unduly favor-
able, the family member may appear to be (or actually be) unquali-
fied for the position, or the service provider may be receiving a
premium over market rates or providing sub-par services. In a typi-
cal example of a family hire, a company hired the stepson of its co-
CEO as the Vice President of Franchise Development, at an an-
nual salary of $95,000.79 The same company also used the brother
" DSG Int'l., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 5 (Oct. 13, 2004).
DSG's ethics code forbids "[m]aintaining financial interest even if passive in any or-
ganization doing business with the Company." DSG Int'l., The Company's Business
Code Of Conduct Policy (Ex. 10.1 to Form 20-F), at 2 (June 16, 2003).
" See Cal. Pizza Kitchen, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 20
(May 1, 2006). California Pizza Kitchen's ethics code states, "there is a likely conflict
of interest if you: [c]ause CPK to engage in business transactions with your relatives
or friends," and that "[a]ny waiver of this Code for executive officers or directors may
be made only by the Board of Directors or Audit Committee and will be promptly
disclosed to the public as required by law and the Nasdaq rules." Cal. Pizza Kitchen,
Inc., Code of Ethics and Business Conduct for Employees, Officers and Directors 2, 9,
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of its co-CEO as a real estate broker, paying $71,000 in 2003,"
$76,165 in 2002, and $145,143 in 2001."
In the category of "leases," the corporation usually rents prop-
erty, either real or personal, to or from an officer of the corpora-
tion. In one case, for example, a company leased a branch office in
Alabama from a corporation in which the President and CEO of
the company owned a minority interest and was president.'
Many corporations enter into lending arrangements with insid-
ers. Some loans involve transactions in which an officer or director
extends credit to the corporation, thereby securing the benefit of
interest payments. More commonly, corporations lend money to
insiders. Making loans can be problematic, however, if the loans
are made in terms unfavorable to the corporation or if they reduce
ready cash flow for corporate use." In one example from the
"loan" category, the company had provided a revolving loan in an
amount not to exceed $1,500,000 to an entity in which the CEO
owned a substantial interest.'
http://media.corporate-ir.net/media-files/irol/12/122300/Code-ofEthicslO3lO8.pdf
(last visited Nov. 1, 2009).
' Cal. Pizza Kitchen, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 20
(May, 1 2006).
8 Cal. Pizza Kitchen, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 44 (June
18, 2004). Recall that this company's code of ethics states, "there is a likely conflict of
interest if you: [c]ause CPK to engage in business transactions with your relatives of
friends." Cal. Pizza Kitchen, Inc., Code of Ethics and Business Conduct for Employ-
ees, Officers and Directors 2, http://media.corporate-ir.net/mediafiles/
irol/12/122300/CodeofEthics103108.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2009).
82 Charter Fin. Corp., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 4, 21 (Jan.
28, 2004). Its ethics code states that "[n]o officer or employee should have any per-
sonal business dealings with the Company or its subsidiaries except as a customer for
financial services.... Investments and dealings prohibited to Charter officers and
employees should be avoided by the members of the employee's family." Charter Fin.
Corp., Conflict of Interest Policy and Code of Conduct (Ex. 14 to Form 10-K) (Dec.
22, 2003).
" Section 402 of Sarbanes-Oxley prohibits loans to executives. See Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 402, 116 Stat. 745, 787 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §
78m(k) (2006)) ("It shall be unlawful for any issuer ... directly or indirectly, including
through any subsidiary, to extend or maintain credit, to arrange for the extension of
credit, or to renew an extension of credit, in the form of a personal loan to or for any
director or executive officer (or equivalent thereof) of that issuer."). It is unclear
whether the loans in this category have been structured to avoid violation of Section
402, or whether they are violating the provision.
" Mun. Mortgage & Equity LLC, Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 72-73 (June 22,
2006). The Code of Ethics for Senior Financial Officers, Mun. Mortgage & Equity,
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2. Gaming the System
Many of the surveyed companies use the slippage between Sec-
tion 406's waiver requirements and Item 404's related-party trans-
action requirements to their advantage. Most of the surveyed com-
panies do not ban "related-party transactions" in their code of
ethics. Section 406, remember, requires nothing more than report-
ing of waivers to a company's own particular code of ethics. If the
code is "diluted," so that it fails to prohibit related-party transac-
tions, then it would appear no waiver is needed.' Although these
related-party transactions occur frequently, by virtue of their omis-
sion from the code of ethics, the companies can-at least so it
would seem-avoid altogether mandatory near-real-time disclo-
sure of these transactions via their websites or 8-Ks.
LLC, Code of Ethics for Senior Financial Officers, http://www.munimae.com/
aboutMuniMae/docs/CodeOfEthics-SeniorOfficers.pdf (last visited Oct. 26, 2009),
requires compliance with Code of Ethics and Principles of Business Integrity, which
provides:
You are expected to avoid any situation in which your personal interests con-
flict, or have the appearance of conflicting, with those of the company....
Loans to, or guarantees of obligations of, directors, officers and employees are
of special concern.... For directors and executive officers, advance disclosure
to and approval by the Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer and the
disinterested members of the Board of Directors are required.... Any waiver
of the Code for executive officers or directors of the Company may be made only
by the Company's Board of Directors or by a committee of the Board of Direc-
tors and must be promptly disclosed to the Company's shareholders.
Mun. Mortgage & Equity, LLC, Code of Ethics and Principles of Business Integrity
4-5, 12, http://www.munimae.com/aboutMuniMae/docs/CodeOfEthics.pdf (last vis-
ited Oct. 26, 2009) (emphasis added). While the actual amount loaned never exceeded
$900,000, we characterize the provision of a $1.5 million revolving line of credit as a
loan.
Only 30 companies include related-party transactions within their code of ethics.
"Parallel literatures exist on, for example, website privacy policies. See, e.g., Corey
A. Ciocchetti, E-Commerce and Information Privacy: Privacy Policies as Personal In-
formation Protectors, 44 Am. Bus. L.J. 55, 68-69 (2007); Allyson W. Haynes, Online
Privacy Policies: Contracting Away Control over Personal Information?, 111 Penn St.
L. Rev. 587, 612-13 (2007); James P. Nehf, Shopping for Privacy Online: Consumer
Decision-Making Strategies and the Emerging Market for Information Privacy, 2005
J.L. Tech. & Pol'y 1, 4-5 (2005). For a parallel analysis of the No Child Left Behind
Act, see James E. Ryan, The Perverse Incentives of the No Child Left Behind Act, 79
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 932, 944 (2004). In each case, the law permits the entity to create the
standard to which it will ultimately be held, thus encouraging the elucidation of a
weak standard in the first instance.
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A close reading of the Act suggests, however, that this tactic may
be illegitimate. Section 406(c) of the Act defines "code of ethics"
as follows:
[T]he term "code of ethics" means such standards as are rea-
sonably necessary to promote-
(1) honest and ethical conduct, including the ethical handling of
actual or apparent conflicts of interest between personal and pro-
fessional relationships;
(2) full, fair, accurate, timely, and understandable disclosure in
the periodic reports required to be filed by the issuer; and
(3) compliance with applicable governmental rules and regula-
tions."
It may be that, by omitting related-party transactions from their
codes of ethics, companies are in violation of Section 406(c)(1), be-
cause prohibiting related-party transactions is "reasonably neces-
sary" to promote "ethical handling of actual or apparent conflicts
of interest between personal and professional relationships." At
the very least, these codes violate the intention or "spirit" of Sec-
tion 406's disclosure requirements. As discussed in Section I.B,
Section 406's waiver provision was specifically enacted to address
Enron's related-party transactions with its CFO, Andy Fastow. Yet
the majority of our sample companies do not forbid related-party
transactions in their codes.
Instead, companies tend to have generic "conflicts of interest"
provisions.' And even when the provisions address related-party
transactions, they use "weasel wording" that makes it hard to find
an actual violation. For example, a code may say that choosing a
"15 U.S.C. § 7264 (2006) (emphasis added). The SEC's final rules elaborated on the
Act's requirements, providing that, in addition to the legislatively mandated require-
ments, the code must provide for "(4) The prompt internal reporting of violations of
the code to an appropriate person or persons identified in the code; and (5) Account-
ability for adherence to the code." 17 C.F.R. § 229.406(b) (2008).
88 Note, however, that one code does not even address conflicts of interest at all. See
Telava, Inc., Code of Ethics (on file with authors).
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service provider because of family relationship is a conflict" or for-
bid a company employee from dealing directly with a supplier who
is also a relative.' Companies are sure to argue that these codes do
not require waivers for related-party transactions. In the first case,
a service provider can be a family member, as long as the hiring did
not occur "because of" the relationship. In the second, as long as
the CFO is not directly dealing with his spouse's company, there is
no violation, even if the corporation is sending millions of dollars
of business her way. Ironically, the SEC initially proposed rules
that required companies to address "[a]voidance of conflicts of in-
terest, including disclosure to an appropriate person or persons
identified in the code of any material transaction or relationship
that reasonably could be expected to give rise to such a
conflict" 9 1-wording that at least invokes related-party
transactions-in their ethics codes. The SEC, however, eliminated
this requirement in the final rule "because the conduct addressed
by this component already is addressed by the first prong of the
proposed definition, requiring honest and ethical conduct and the
ethical handling of actual and apparent conflicts of interest."'
There is much room to criticize the SEC's retreat in this area be-
cause there is evidence that some related-party transactions signifi-
cantly reduce shareholder wealth. In particular, stockholders react
negatively when (1) a related-party transaction is initiated after the
" Devry Inc., Code of Business Conduct and Ethics, http://www.devryinc.com/
corporate information/pdfs/code ofconduct.pdf (last visited Oct. 26, 2009) (Forbid-
ding "[d]irecting business to a supplier based on the fact that the supplier is owned,
managed by or employs a relative").
" See, e.g., Ocean Bio-Chem, Inc., Code of Ethics (Ex. B to Form DEF 14A), at 2
(Apr. 13, 2004) ("Unless approved in advance by an employee's supervisor, neither an
employee nor his or her spouse, domestic partner, or any other member of the em-
ployee's immediate family may directly or indirectly have a financial interest (whether
as an investor, lender, employee or other service provider) in a competitor, or in a
customer or supplier if that employee or his or her subordinates deal directly or indi-
rectly with that customer or supplier in the course of his or her job with the Company.")
(emphasis added).
" Proposed Rule: Disclosure Required by Sections 404, 406 and 407 of the Sar-
banes-Oxley Act of 2002, Exchange Act Release No. 46,701, 67 Fed. Reg. 66,208
(2002), reprinted in [2002 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 86,733, at
86,352 (Oct. 22, 2002) (footnotes omitted).
' Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
Exchange Act Release No. 47,235, 68 Fed. Reg. 5110, 5118 (2003), reprinted in [2002-
2003 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 86,828, at 86,896 (Jan. 29, 2003).
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counterparty becomes related to the firm; and (2) a transaction en-
tails the handing down of executive positions to family members.'
Also, researchers have found that firms that engage in certain re-
lated-party transactions are more likely to manage earnings, possi-
bly to mask expropriation occurring through the related-party
transaction.9 4 Finally, a recent study suggests that Hong Kong-listed
firms acquire assets from related parties at prices that are higher,
and sell assets to them at prices that are lower, than in similar deals
that are arm's-length transactions.' When viewed as a whole, this
evidence suggests that firms should police transactions of this kind
closely.
3. "In Spirit" Violations
Whatever results sound policy might support, the practical real-
ity is that Section 406's reach is limited. In particular, even though
Section 406 came as a response to Enron's board-approved related-
party transactions, many companies omit these transactions en-
tirely from their codes of ethics. Arguably, these companies hurt
only themselves, because the market will internalize the weakness
of their codes of ethics, and discount stock prices accordingly. But
for our purposes, these "in spirit" violations show how easily and
routinely companies can evade the intent of regulation when it is
couched in terms of disclosure.
Consider this example: DHB Industries, Inc. subleased a facility
from an LLC controlled by the CEO's wife and beneficially owned
by his minor children. Payments to the LLC were $682,000 in
2003.96 DHB also bought $29 million of products from a company
owned by the CEO's wife, and $560,000 in services from a third
" See Michael D. Ryngaert & Shawn E. Thomas, Related Party Transactions: Their
Origins and Wealth Effects 3-4, 30-31 (Sept. 20, 2007) (unpublished manuscript,
available at http://ssrn.comlabstract=970689).
" See Elizabeth A. Gordon & Elaine Henry, Related Party Transactions and Earn-
ings Management 4-8, 25-26 (Nov. 9, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=612234).
See Yan-Leung Cheung et al., Buy High, Sell Low: How Listed Firms Price Asset
Transfers in Related Party Transactions, 33 J. Banking & Fin. 914, 915, 923-24 (2009).
"DHB Capital Group Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 13-14
(Nov. 24, 2004). Note: in an apparent re-branding move, DHB changed its name after
the fraud allegations emerged. See infra note 101.
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company owned by the wife in 2003.' See Figure 2. DHB's ethics
code provides, however, that "[clonflicts of interest are prohib-
ited .. . except under guidelines approved by the Company's Board
of Directors."' Because we do not know what the guidelines state,
we cannot classify this as an actual violation. (Incidentally, the
CEO also charged more than $2 million of non-business expenses
on company credit cards" and was eventually charged with
fraud. ")
Figure 2
$682,000/yr.
-~ ~ Lease
$29 million
DHB Indus.
Produ
560,000
Services
Manager:
CEO's wife
Owner:
CEO's children
cts
' DHB Capital Group Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 14
(Nov. 24, 2004).
' DHB Industries, Inc., Code of Business Conduct and Ethics (Ex. 14 to Form 10-
K), at 3 (Mar. 17, 2005).
* DHB Capital Group Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 7
(Nov. 24,2004).
"Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Charges Former CEO of Military
Body Armor Supplier With Financial Fraud and Insider Trading (Oct. 25, 2007),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-221.htm.
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In 70 instances, the company reported a related-party transac-
tion in proxy materials, but its code of ethics did not prohibit the
transaction so as to trigger a disclosure obligation under Section
406. Unfettered by the latter constraint, the companies were free to
delay reporting these transactions until their annual filings, rather
than filing a waiver to the codes of ethics within four business days
of the transaction. We term this an "in-spirit violation," because
while the nondisclosure of a waiver may not technically violate
SOX, it violates the spirit of the Act by permitting transactions in-
volving conflicts of interest at the highest levels of the corporate
organization."o' Out of 200 companies, 45 violated the spirit of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Once again, Table VII breaks down the types
of transactions into separate categories-namely asset sales, family
hires, interlocking positions, leases, loans, products, and services.
In one example of an "in spirit" asset sale violation, Atlantic
Tele-Network, Inc.'s board of directors authorized discussions re-
garding the sale of all of its remaining assets in the corporation's
business in Haiti, including an office building and thirteen tower
sites, to its Chairman. The Chairman was also the father of Atlantic
Tele-Network's Chief Executive Officer.l" Because Atlantic Tele-
Network's code of ethics did not prohibit related-party transactions
and required merely reporting a conflict of interest to the com-
pany's general counsel,"o3 it was able to delay disclosure of the sale
for almost a full year."
American Pacific Corp. provides an example of a family-hire "in
spirit" transgression. That firm was a 70% holder of a corporation
in which the CEO's brother, sister-in-law, and nephew were minor-
ity holders. This other company also leased space to American Pa-
cific.0 '
" For this discussion we leave to one side the question whether the Act actually
permits omitting related-party transactions from codes of ethics.
"' Atlantic Tele-Network, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 30
(Apr. 30, 2007).
, Atlantic Tele-Network, Inc., Code of Ethics, http://www.atni.com/corp-gov.
phE#coe (last visited Oct. 26,2009).
The transaction occurred in May 2006, and the disclosure was filed in April 2007.
See Atlantic Tele-Network, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 30
(Apr. 30, 2007).
American Pacific Corp., Preliminary Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 6, 15
(Jan. 28, 2005). Its ethics code provides that "[n]o director or employee of the Com-
pany shall have any outside business or financial interest, direct or indirect, in any
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"Interlocking positions" occur when an officer is also an officer,
director, partner, or employee of a company that either provides
services to the corporation, does business with the corporation, or
is in competition with the corporation. Interlocking positions are
problematic because the officer or director serving in an interlock-
ing position has fiduciary duties to different companies whose in-
terests may conflict. In one example of interlocking positions, At-
lantic Tele-Network acquired a significant minority interest in, and
provided funds to, LighTrade, Inc. Atlantic Tele Network's CEO
was also an officer of LighTrade, Inc.10
In one example of a lease that was a violation "in spirit," Granite
City Food & Brewery entered into a leasing agreement for equip-
ment. The agreement was with an entity in which Granite City's
CEO had a substantial interest."
In a loan example, Atlantic Tele-Network acquired a significant
minority interest in LighTrade and wrote off $570,000 of secured
loans as uncollectible. The company's Chairman, the CEO's father,
had invested at least $600,000 in LighTrade."'
The "products" category encompasses instances in which the
firm purchases products from or sells products to an entity in which
one of its executive officers has a substantial interest. For example,
Calavo Growers, Inc. bought papayas from an entity owned by the
company's CEO for $2.92 million in one year." Using a form of
"trust us" disclosure described more fully below in Subsection
III.C.5, the corporation stated that because some of its directors,
officers, and employees grow produce and enter into marketing
Outside Concern or Competing Concern, which conflicts with the interests of the
Company, or which interferes with his or her ability to fully perform his or her job re-
sponsibilities." American Pacific Corp. & Subsidiaries, Standards
of Business Conduct, http://media.corporate-ir.net/mediafiles/irol/78/78284/
StandardsBusinessConduct.pdf (last visited Oct. 26, 2009). But it does not cover the
relatives of employees, so there is no actual violation when the minority holders are
the CEO's brother, sister-in-law, and nephew.
" Atlantic Tele-Network, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 17
(Apr. 18, 2006).
Granite City Food & Brewery Ltd., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF
14A), at 35 (Sept. 25, 2007).
" Atlantic Tele-Network, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 17
(Air. 18, 2006).
Calavo Growers, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 15 (Mar.
1, 2004).
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agreements with Calavo, there would be no violations requiring
waivers "as long as the terms of the agreements are no more favor-
able to the directors, officers and employees than agreements that
we enter into with third parties.,1 o While these transactions might
indeed have been market-priced, investors are left to trust the com-
pany's assertion without recourse to the facts of the particular
transaction.
Table VII. "In Spirit" Violations
Type of Number of Transactions
Transaction (Excluding Actual Violations)
Asset Sales 16
Family Hires 16
Interlocking 1Positions
Leases 8
Loans 7
Products 5
Services 13
Other 4
Total 70
4. Repeat Players
Perhaps unsurprisingly, we find that companies who violate Sec-
tion 406 once tend to do so multiple times."' Of 37 companies vio-
lating at least once, 17 do so more than once. DHB Industries, the
corporation discussed above in Figure 2, had six violations (all "in
spirit") over the sample period. DHB's former CEO and COO
were each charged with securities fraud, insider trading, tax eva-
"' Calavo Gowers, Inc., Code of Business Conduct and Ethics,
http://www.calavo.com/CALAVO%2OEthics%2OPolicy.pdf (last visited Oct. 26,
2009).
." The reader may have noted that one company, Atlantic Tele-Network, appears
repeatedly in the previously listed examples.
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sion, and other criminal offenses; the SEC also filed a civil com-
plaint against the former CEO accusing him of similar violations. 2
5. "Trust Us"
Finally, we treat as a separate category "trust us" disclosures in-
volving banks and two other companies. Most banks disclosed that
they made loans or had commercial relationships with their officers
and directors. They did not disclose the individual recipients of the
loans or the amounts received, but rather made blanket disclosures
such as that loans to executive officers were made "on substantially
the same terms . .. as those prevailing at the time for comparable
transactions with other persons."" We group these disclosures
separately, since we are unable to determine whether the CEO,
CFO, or CAO received loans, or what the terms and amounts
were. Some banks specified the total of these "insider loans,"
which in one case was as low as $418,666, and in another case was
as high as $33 million, representing "approximately 1.4% of con-
solidated stockholders' equity."" One company included this sin-
gularly unhelpful disclosure:
From time to time in the ordinary course of business, the Com-
pany does business with and/or engages in other transactions be-
tween itself and certain affiliated parties. Management of the
Company believes that such dealings and transactions are imma-
terial in nature and have been on terms no less favorable to the
Company than those that could have been obtained from unaf-
filiated parties."'
112 Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Charges Former CEO of Military
Body Armor Supplier With Financial Fraud and Insider Trading (Oct. 25, 2007),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-221.htm; Robert E. Kessler,
Point Blank Founder Held; Ex-CEO Arrested, Charged With Looting Company,
Sun-Sentinel, Oct. 26, 2007, at 1D.
"'Pacwest Bancorp, Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 39 (Apr. 11,
2007); see also Charter Fin. Corp., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at
21 Jan. 28, 2004).
Associated Banc-Corp, Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 31 (Mar.
11, 2008); Charter Fin. Corp., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 21
(Jan. 28, 2004).
"' See Back Yard Burgers, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 15
(Apr. 19,2004).
2010]1 43
Virginia Law Review
We place these kinds of disclosures in a separate category be-
cause they show that the corporation conducts business with its in-
siders without disclosing the specifics. On one hand, these compa-
nies signal that related-party transactions do occur, but on the
other hand they assure investors that these "inside deals" are iden-
tical to arm's-length transactions. This practice is the ultimate non-
transparent disclosure. The whole premise of related-party disclo-
sure-indeed, of all disclosure-is that the devil is in the details;
such imprecise disclosure makes a mockery of the requirements by
not giving the market concrete information.
Table VIII.
Type of Transaction Number of Transactions
Banks 12
Other 2
6. Assessing the Extent of Actual Harm to the Market
Whether an undisclosed deal involves an asset purchase, family
purchase, lease, or loan, or whether a company just asks the public
to "trust us," a predictable response to the pattern of waiver disclo-
sure described above is "no harm, no foul." On this view, even
though insider transactions are not disclosed as waivers under Sec-
tion 406, they are being disclosed, as Congress intended, by way of
publicly available proxy materials.
There are, however, significant problems with this "so what?"
response. First and foremost, immediate disclosure differs from
eventual disclosure. Any investor or would-be investor would want
to know about related-party transactions"-one of the starkest
conflicts of interest within a corporation-immediately; otherwise,
that person might well rely on the absence of such information dur-
ing the very time it is held back. Presumably, for this reason, Sec-
tion 406 requires near-real-time 8-K or website disclosure for
CEO-level waivers. Item 404, in contrast, channels information to
investors only once a year, in the 10-K or proxy. In short, by not
"' Related-party transactions occur when a company completes a transaction with
directors or officers or their family members.
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reporting CEO-level transactions as conflict waivers, companies
may delay disclosure by a year; in almost all cases the delay will far
exceed the brief four-day period established by Section 406.
Furthermore, proxy statements contain information that ranges
far beyond related-party transactions. Typically, they set forth
stock option plans, biographies of directors, executive officers,
promoters and control persons, executive compensation, stock
holdings of large shareholders and management, issues to be voted
on, and accounting fees and services. Thus, proxy disclosure is
muddled disclosure, providing companies with the opportunity to
obscure negative information by disclosing it along with a plethora
of other matters. If investors have a large amount of information to
process and only limited time and attention (as they do), then dis-
closing information in a "noisy" setting may distract investors from
otherwise pertinent information."' Notably, there is evidence that
such behavior marks accounting disclosure and reporting choices."'
And if diversionary disclosure occurs in these contexts, why should
it not occur in providing information about self-dealing transac-
tions?
The Subsections below discuss variations of the "no harm, no
foul" objection. Subsection III.C.6.a discusses the possibility that
separate SEC rules might have the effect of requiring disclosure of
insider transactions in the four-day 8-K timeframe, and concludes
that most disclosure is, in fact, delayed. Subsection III.C.6.b ad-
dresses the possibility that firms might be predisclosing insider
transactions, so that, rather than being delayed, information in the
proxy is brought to the market before the transactions occur. Simi-
larly, we find that most companies do not practice ex ante disclo-
sure. We conclude that Section 406 disclosure practice, in contra-
vention of the law, truly does delay the process of revealing insider
transactions to the marketplace.
". For more on this phenomenon, see generally Daniel Kahneman, Attention and
Effort (1973).
"' David Hirshleifer & Siew Hong Teoh, Limited Attention, Information Disclo-
sure, and Financial Reporting, 36 J. Acct. & Econ. 337, 339-44 (2003).
2010] 45
Virginia Law Review
a. Immediate Disclosure Not Identified as Ethics Waiver
Our findings present the twin problems of disclosure delayed
and disclosure mislabeled. Transactions that should be disclosed on
Form 8-Ks within four business days after occurrence and identi-
fied as waivers are instead not disclosed until the year-end proxy
statement and, in consequence, are buried among other informa-
tion. Such delay and obfuscation might be avoided, however, if
other SEC rules required 8-K disclosure of related-party transac-
tions.
Notably, under already existing law some related-party transac-
tions must be disclosed almost immediately. Item 1.01 of Form 8-K
requires firms to disclose via 8-K the entry into a "material defini-
tive agreement" not made in the ordinary course of business. The
instructions elaborate that all agreements (regardless of whether
they are in the ordinary course of business) must be disclosed via 8-
K if they involve, among other issues, "[a]ny contract to which di-
rectors, officers, promoters, voting trustees, security holders named
in the registration statement or report, or underwriters are parties
other than contracts involving only the purchase or sale of current
assets having a determinable market price, at such market price."11
Thus-as Figure 3 highlights-a subset of the related-party trans-
actions we found were, or should have been, disclosed within four
business days both in Form 8-Ks as material definitive agreements
and separately as ethics waivers.
Of the 103 total cases where belated disclosure occurred via
proxy, only 11 were disclosed via 8-K as material definitive agree-
ments near the time they occurred; 10 were "in spirit" violations
and 1 was an actual violation.120 So we are left with 92 related-party
transactions that were disclosed in the year-end proxy but should
." Standard Instructions for Filing Forms Under Securities Act of 1933, Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975-Regulation
S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.601(b)(10)(ii)(A) (2008) (emphasis added).
120 One transaction was disclosed via 8-K but did not clearly state that the CEO was
the purchaser of the company's asset, so we did not treat it as adequate disclosure of
the nature of the transaction.
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have been disclosed as waivers immediately. Of those 92, 63 are "in
spirit" violations, and 29 are actual violations of Section 406.121
Figure 3
121 Research into the possibility of this Form 8-K disclosure is complicated by the
fact that most related-party transactions disclosed in the year-end proxies are not
dated; in fact, only 38 are dated.
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b. Timing of Disclosure
Disclosure of related-party transactions in annual reports instead
of via 8-K waiver clearly causes delay. But if companies disclose
proposed or upcoming related-party transactions in their proxies,
investors might actually be better informed than if they had to wait
for ex post disclosure via 8-K (where disclosure is required within
four business days after the transaction).
For this reason, we examined when companies chose to disclose
their related-party transactions in proxy materials. For 22 compa-
nies, we could not tell whether the disclosure was made before or
after the transaction. Only four companies clearly made all of their
related-party transaction disclosures before they went through with
the transaction. Thirty companies made all of their related-party
transaction disclosures after they went through with the transac-
tion. Thirty-six companies made some related-party transaction
disclosures both before and after the transaction occurred, usually
disclosing that the company has in the past engaged in certain be-
havior and would continue to do so in the future.
Because a substantial majority of companies do not disclose re-
lated-party transactions ex ante, it appears that proxies are not
regularly providing information on prospective conflict transac-
tions to investors.
7. The Waivers that Weren't
The above Subsections of this Part have described our findings
regarding the "on the ground" practice of ethics waiver disclosure.
Our sample of 200 companies revealed only one ethics waiver over
five years that was appropriately labeled and disclosed as a
waiver.122 We began Section III.C with a question: where are all the
waivers? Our cross-check against company proxy statements pro-
vides an answer: many related-party transactions that should have
been disclosed as waivers were not actually revealed to the market.
The 33 actual violations are cases where the ethics code clearly
prohibits the transaction at issue and the corporate conduct thus
demonstrably required a waiver. The 70 "in spirit" violations, in
122 While it is true that some of these transactions might have been appropriately dis-
closed as waivers via website and then removed, we have no way of identifying such
cases because of the uncertain nature of website disclosure.
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contrast, are cases where, because of "weasel wording," we are un-
able to find an actual violation. Often firms do not prohibit related-
party transactions or provide internal mechanisms for their ap-
proval.
In the only prior study of ethics waivers, Madoka Mori hypothe-
sized a version of our "in spirit" violations as an explanation for
the dearth of ethics waivers under Section 406. In a study of all
waivers filed with the SEC from 2004-2006 (ignoring the possibility
of website disclosure),'" Mori found only 26 waivers. 24 Her expla-
nation for the small number, like ours, focuses on companies play-
ing fast and loose with regulatory definitions. Instead of focusing
on the definition of "code of ethics," however, Mori focused on
what she termed a "hypertechnical" definition of the term
"waiver.""' According to her, although Sarbanes-Oxley and the
SEC's rules do not define the term, the instructions to Form 8-K
define waivers as "approval by the [company] of a material depar-
ture from a provision of the code of ethics." 26 Mori observed that
companies may well have sidestepped the need to disclose waivers
by adopting codes that provide for "approvals, permissions, or au-
thorizations." 27 With such code language in place, Mori posited, a
company could reason that an approval is not a "departure," and
thus need not be disclosed. 28
Although Mori's theory may accurately describe the rationale of
some corporations for not reporting more waivers, the chairman of
Enron's audit committee and finance committee tried a similar
sleight-of-hand before the Senate when he testified that there was
no waiver of Enron's code of conduct when it "approved" the re-
lated-party transactions with Fastow.129 Nevertheless, a Senate staff
report rejected the Enron official's proffered sophistry and charac-
terized the behavior as a waiver."'
'" We discuss the results of our parallel study in Part IV, which reveals 36 total eth-
ics waivers through 2007. Unlike Mori, we conducted event studies of the disclosed
waivers.
'" Mori, supra note 28, at 304.
'2 Id. at 293.
126 Id.
12 Id. at 305-06.
'" Id. at 306.
12 Id. at 298 n.20.
.3o Id. at 299.
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To make yet another interpretive argument, it may be that the
companies that failed to disclose waivers relied on the materiality
language of the instructions to argue that the transactions were not
"material" departures from the code. Again, this argument is
strained. The SEC obviously believes a reasonable investor would
find related-party transactions of over $120,000 to be material, pre-
sumably not because of their dollar value (minor in comparison to
the assets of a large public company), but because of what they
represent-the possibility that the CEO, CFO, and CAO are just
in the game to enrich themselves at the expense of shareholders.
These interpretive questions reveal important points about how
disclosure rules work "on the ground." In 33 cases companies seem
to have violated the law. In 70 cases companies might have relied
on watered-down ethics codes that do not prohibit related-party
transactions, internal approval mechanisms (Mori's hypothesis), or
a characterization of the transaction as non-material in order to
evade the reach of Section 406. The net effect is that, despite a dis-
closure mandate intended to reveal corporate transactions with the
CEO, CFO, and CAO, companies are routinely allowing their sen-
ior officers to engage in conflicting interest transactions without
immediately disclosing them to the market as required by Section
406.
D. The Curious Case of Viacom
During the course of research outside of our sample, we found
three waivers filed by Viacom via website. This discovery demon-
strates first that companies do use their websites to disclose waiv-
ers. More important, these disclosures illustrate how the website
disclosure option may facilitate misleading behavior, even at a For-
tune 500 company.
First, some background: prior to the publications of these Via-
com waivers, Sumner Redstone, the firm's Chairman and CEO,
controlled 70.8% of Viacom's votes through his control of National
Amusements, a major holder of Viacom class A shares.m' The
1' Viacom, Inc., Exhibit (Ex. 99 to Form 8-K), at 7-8 (Oct. 28, 2004). National
Amusements, Inc., through its wholly-owned subsidiary, NAIRI, Inc., owned shares
of Viacom. See infra note 135. Because both are controlled by Redstone, we treat
them as a single entity for purposes of this discussion.
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common stock of Viacom is divided into two classes. Class A
shares entitle the owner to one vote per share, while class B
shares-the only other form of Viacom common stock-afford the
owner no voting rights. Viacom announced that it was instituting a
stock repurchase program in keeping with a plan, not uncommon
among public companies, to use excess capital to buy up out-
standing shares. In general, the announcement of such programs
triggers an increase in share prices because investors assume that a
firm will undertake a buyback only if the firm's shares are under-
valued.'32 These repurchases, then, result in an essentially tax-
deferred distribution to shareholders, since capital gains can be
postponed.'
Using its website, Viacom disclosed an October 28, 2004 agree-
ment with National Amusements, Inc.; it later disclosed two simi-
lar agreements in 2005 and 2007, and their corresponding Section
406 waivers on its website.m The agreements are identical in na-
ture. Each was entered into by National Amusements (the entity
controlled by Redstone) and Viacom, and each permitted National
Amusements to participate in Viacom's repurchase program of
common stock.36 In particular, the agreements allowed National
Amusements (essentially Redstone) to participate in the repur-
chase program by allowing its Viacom class B shares (not class A
132 See Clifford P. Stephens & Michael S. Weisbach, Actual Share Reacquisitions in
Open-Market Repurchase Programs, 53 J. Fin. 313, 316 (1998).
3 Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, Financing Decisions: Who Issues Stock?,
76 J. Fin. Econ. 549, 554 (2005).
'" See Viacom, Inc., Waiver of Conflict of Interest (Oct. 29, 2004),
http://www.cbscorporation.com/assets/documents/waivers[1].pdf. Viacom has since
split into CBS Corporation and Viacom; the 2004 agreement is on the website of the
surviving company, CBS Corporation.
'
3 Viacom, Inc., Waiver of Conflict of Interest (Jan. 1, 2006) (updated June
26, 2007), http://www.viacom.comL/investorrelations/InvestorRelations Docs/New_
Viacom BCS Waiver.pdf. In 2005, Viacom spun off from CBS Corporation; the
waivers for the 2005 agreement and 2007 agreements are disclosed on the spin-off
company's site, Viacom.com.
'" A $3 billion program was introduced in 2005. Press Release, Viacom, Inc., Via-
com Announces $3 Billion Stock Purchase Program for Post-Separation
'New' Viacom (Dec. 12, 2005), available at http://www.mywire.com/a/
PRNewswire//1111931?&pbl=273. A $4 billion program was introduced in 2007. Press
Release, Viacom, Inc., Viacom Board Authorizes New $4 Billion
Common Stock Purchase Program (May 30, 2007), available at
http://www.prdomain.com/companies/V/Viacom/newsreleases/200753142526.htm.
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shares) to be bought by Viacom in tandem with the repurchase of
class A and class B shares on the open market. The waivers state
that the agreements are "intended to maintain [National Amuse-
ments'] percentage equity ownership in Viacom, which would oth-
erwise increase as a result of purchases made by Viacom pursuant
to the stock purchase program."137 This statement suggests that
Redstone's relative percentage of both class A and B shares would
remain constant as a result of the program. In fact, however, the
agreements provided only that Mr. Redstone's class B shares were
to be repurchased.
There are two stories we can tell about these waivers, one benign
and one malign. According to the benign version, the agreement is
meant to do no more than what the waiver states-that is, to main-
tain National Amusements' (and through it Sumner Redstone's)
ownership percentage. In other words, without the agreements,
Redstone's ownership interest would increase by mere virtue of the
decrease in the number of outstanding shares. Indeed, his equity
ownership percentage remains about the same.
A more sinister (and perhaps more believable) story is that the
stock purchase plan and accompanying National Amuse-
ments/Viacom agreements effectuate a consolidation of Redstone's
control, simultaneously permitting him to take cash out of the firm.
As seen in Table IX, Redstone's total equity ownership changes
very little from 2003, before the repurchase program is announced,
to 2008.3 But because Redstone only sold back the non-voting
class B shares while other stockholders relinquished both class A
and class B shares, he increased his control of the firm (via class A
shares) by about 12%. Thus, Redstone increased his liquidity by
selling class B shares while increasing his control over Viacom by
simply allowing the firm to repurchase all class A shares except his
own.
m3 Viacom, Inc., Waiver of Conflict of Interest (Jan. 1, 2006) (updated
June 26, 2007), http://www.viacom.com/investorrelations/InvestorRelationsDocs/
New Viacom BCS Waiver.pdf.
18 Note that Viacom spun off from CBS Corp. between the 2005 and 2006 proxy
statements, thus drastically changing the shares-outstanding figures.
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Table IX. Viacom Common Stock Ownership of Sumner
Redstone
Dec. 31, Jan. 31, Jan. 31, Jan. 31, Feb. 28, Feb. 29,
2002 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
A shares 134,927,417 132,240,431 131,502,564 64,746,608 59,204,427 57,373,071
outstanding
B shares 1,620,258,015 1,609,582,323 1,509,115,879 658,818,097 631,454,028 580,818,177
outstanding
Redstone's A 93,658,828 93,658,908 93,658,908 46,829,454 46,829,454 46,829,454
shares
Redstone's B 104 ,334 ,828 104,345,072 98,016,075 40,099,894 33,059,452 26,850,810
shares
Redstone's 69.4% 70.8% 71.2% 72.3% 79.1% 81.6%
% A (voting)
shares
Redstone's 6.4% 6.5% 6.5% 6.1% 5.2% 4.6%
% B
(nonvoting)
shares
Redstone's 11.3% 11.4% 11.7% 12.0% 11.6% 11.5%
total equity
ownership
None of this was disclosed in the Section 406 website waivers.
Rather than telling the market, "I'm increasing my voting control
of Viacom and at the same time taking money out for my wholly-
owned subsidiary," the waivers suggested only that Redstone's
shares would be required as part of the overarching stock buy-back
plan. The notices thus implied that Redstone's voting control
would not increase, when it actually did by a significant measure.
Whatever one concludes about the motives that gave rise to
these events, Viacom's disclosure choices are interesting to say the
least. As noted, all three waivers were filed on the companies' web-
sites (the 2007 waiver was filed as an "update" to the 2005 waiver,
making it appear from the website that only one waiver was dis-
closed, even though there were really two), and all state that an 8-
K was filed with the SEC outlining the term sheet for the agree-
ment. All 8-K filings were in fact made as disclosed. Each filing,
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however, was made only under the heading of "Entry into a Mate-
rial Definitive Agreement"; none made any mention of an ethics
waiver under Section 406.' In other words, although the company
disclosed the agreements to the market in real time via an 8-K,
each agreement was flagged as requiring conflict waivers only in
website disclosure, not in the SEC filings.
The Viacom waivers are interesting on at least two fronts. First,
they show that website disclosures sometimes occur. Despite the
fact that almost half of our sample firms (46%) provided for web-
site disclosure, we did not find a single website disclosure. Second,
the Viacom waivers raise a prospect we had not initially antici-
pated. Viacom was forced by SEC rules to disclose National
Amusements' stock repurchase contract as a "material definitive
agreement," thus providing near-real-time disclosure via 8-K. It
simultaneously chose to avoid the taint of labeling the transaction
as one that departed from the firm's internal ethics rules. To be
sure, the agreement itself was disclosed, and an efficient markets
argument would state that investors could process that information
without any need to attach to it an "ethics waiver" designation.
Avoiding a Form 8-K disclosure of ethics waivers seems to have
mattered to Viacom, however, because it chose a convoluted path
of double disclosure (both via website and via 8-K) that avoided
having to flag the transaction's questionable ethical component in
the filing made with the SEC.140
We are unaware of other types of disclosure that the SEC per-
mits companies to make by website publication rather than by SEC
filings. The Viacom example points out some of the problems that
lurk in this legal regime. For example, there is no guidance as to
how to label waivers: Viacom was able to make two waivers look
like one by adding its 2007 waiver as an "update" to the 2005 one.
Failing to require continued web access means a corporation can
erase a checkered ethical past in a matter of twelve months. In fact,
'Viacom, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (June 26, 2007); Viacom, Inc., Current
Report (Form 8-K) (Dec. 23, 2005); Viacom, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Oct.
29, 2004).
'An alternative explanation, however, is that Viacom, having told investors that it
would disclose waivers on its website, felt constrained to disclose the waivers on its
website rather than just putting the information in the material definitive agreement
8-K or companion waiver 8-K.
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as of March 2009, it seems impossible to navigate the Viacom web-
site so as to find the disclosed waivers, although the link provided
in the footnotes was still functional at the time of writing. If the
disclosures had to be made on Form 8-Ks filed with the SEC, how-
ever, a centralized, permanent record would exist. Website disclo-
sure seems to presume that investors will continually prowl a com-
pany's investor relations site on the lookout for disclosure of an
ethics waiver. This presumption, in our view, is unrealistic and has
given rise only to confusion and incompleteness in Section 406 dis-
closures.
IV. ALL CONFLICT WAIVERS FILED WITH THE SEC
A. Methodology
In addition to researching the random sample of 200 companies
described in Part III, we also used a subscription-based search en-
gine, 10k Wizard, to search SEC filings. In particular, we searched
8-K and 8-K/A forms under Item 5.05 (the appropriate heading for
a Section 406 waiver) and the terms "code," "ethics," and
"waiver." Because many 8-K filings make reference to Item 5.05
only by stating that it was "not applicable," we screened out the
term "applicable." This data set does not include all reported waiv-
ers, however, because companies can also disclose waivers on their
websites. Nevertheless, given that we found no waiver disclosure
on the websites of the 200 sample companies, we presume that this
second data set of all 8-K waivers filed with the SEC is fairly ro-
bust, though not exhaustive.
B. Observations about Waivers
Our search yielded 29 companies filing 36 waivers between 2004
and 2007. As shown in Table IX, we classified waivers into six dif-
ferent categories. The most numerous, "wealth transfers," covers
instances in which there is a transfer of wealth from the firm to one
of its officers or directors. Wealth transfers take three main forms:
(1) the firm acquires another firm owned by a manager or director;
(2) the firm undertakes a real estate transaction (that is, leasing or
buying) in which the real estate is owned by a manager or director
of the firm; or (3) the firm buys a service or product from a com-
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pany in which a manager or director holds a stake. In an illustrative
real estate transaction, the corporation amended a current lease ar-
rangement for the corporation's headquarters with its chief execu-
tive officer. 4 ' As an example of the "services" category, the corpo-
ration authorized a licensing and manufacturing services
agreement with a company controlled by the corporation's CEO.'42
The category with the second most numerous observations is
"interlocking positions." By way of example, Wheeling-Pittsburgh
Corp. authorized its CEO and its president to act as minority own-
ers, directors, and executive officers of a company that competed
with the corporation in a few narrowly defined ventures.'43
We classified five waivers as disclosing related-party transac-
tions. In one example, IVAX Corp. waived its code of ethics to
permit its entry into a consulting agreement with a company con-
trolled by the CEO's nephew and a services agreement with the
same CEO's son.144
There are five waivers we classified as "blackout transactions."
These waivers include instances in which the corporation allows an
officer or director to purchase or sell stock during a period when
such sales are usually prohibited, a so-called "blackout period." In
one case, the chairman of the board of National Coal Corp. was au-
thorized to sell 100,000 shares of stock to an investor outside of the
designated trading window.'45
The "personal investment" category contains four waivers that
center on a director's or manager's personal investments, including
those involving the securities of the firm. For example, a waiver
was granted to the president of American Capital Strategies, allow-
ing him to invest in a private placement and an initial public offer-
ing of firms unrelated to the firm's investment activities.146
141 Hauppauge Digital, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 2 (Oct. 18, 2006).
1
42 Marvell Tech. Group Ltd., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 2 (Aug. 11, 2005).
Wheeling-Pittsburgh Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 4 (Dec. 6, 2006).
' IVAX disclosed the agreement with the CEO's nephew on two occasions. See
IVAX Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 2 (Oct. 12, 2004) (providing for
eighteen-month term of agreement); IVAX Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 2
(Sept. 21, 2005) (providing for renewal). IVAX disclosed the employment agreement
with the CEO's son in a different waiver. See IVAX Corp., Current Report (Form 8-
K), at 2 (Feb. 8, 2005).
15Nat'l Coal Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 2 (Apr. 3, 2007).
'See Am. Capital Strategies, Ltd., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 2 (Dec. 21,
2006).
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Finally, there are four waivers that do not fit into any of these
five categories; we classified these waivers as "other." In one case,
Tivo, Inc. filed a waiver that authorized a board member to sit on
more boards than the firm's code of ethics permitted (a maximum
of two board seats).47 in a waiver that involved a CFO's claim of an
abuse of power, Hooper Holmes chose to take no action against a
CEO who had obtained company reimbursement for $23,000 of
personal expenses, which the company deemed immaterial.148 A
waiver filed by G-III Apparel allowed two of its directors to ac-
quire an interest in a customer.149 Additionally, Overstock.com filed
a waiver allowing one director to make a personal loan to another
director."'o This seemingly harmless waiver, in contrast to waivers
granted to managers and directors in the context of transfers of
wealth from the company to the director or manager, highlights the
vast range of actions covered by codes of ethics and code waivers.
C. Predictions
Given the large number of publicly traded companies-over
5,000-and the five-year time span of the study, the number of
waivers filed is surprisingly low. Notably, the SEC predicted in
2002 that filings of code amendments and waivers would be "rela-
tively rare events,".' but at the same time it envisioned that such
"rare" events would result in an increase of 4,400 filings per year.152
Even assuming that the SEC expected that most filings would con-
cern amendments and only a quarter would concern waivers, there
would still be 1,100 filings per year or a total of 5,500 over the sam-
ple period. The total number of filed waivers we found was 36.
"' Tivo, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 2 (Feb. 15, 2005).148 Hooper Holmes, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 2 (Oct. 25,2004).
'9 G-III Apparel Group Ltd., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 1 (Nov. 9, 2004).
o
50 Overstock.com, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 2 (Aug. 6, 2007).
"' Proposed Rule: Disclosure Required by Sections 404, 406 and 407 of the Sar-
banes-Oxley Act of 2002, Exchange Act Release No. 46,701, 67 Fed. Reg. 66,208
(2002), reprinted in [2002 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 86,773, at
86,352 (Oct. 22, 2002) ("We believe that changes to a company's code of ethics and
waivers from a code will be relatively rare events. Therefore, we expect that on aver-
age, a company will file a Form 8-K to report such an event once every three years,
resulting in a total increase of 4,400 filings on Form 8-K per year.").
1
52 Id. In its calculation, the SEC may have failed to consider the possibility of web-
site disclosure.
2010] 57
58 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 96:1
A review of the content of the waivers also indicates that the dis-
closed information is of little significance. Unlike the information
on related-party transactions obtained by examining proxy state-
ments and cross-checking with ethics codes,"' these 36 waivers are
generally ethically unobjectionable. We hypothesize that, because
of the relative newness and scarcity of Section 406 ethics waivers,
firms have been loath to file them except in cases that show no
signs of unfairness to the company. Thus, we predict that any filed
waivers involve generally useless information and that the market
will not react to the information disclosed.
' See supra Section III.C.
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Table X. Waivers
This table shows the number of observations of each type of
waiver found. In Panel A we classified waivers in the first column
and reported the number of each type in the second column. In the
remaining columns we reported the cumulative abnormal return
(CAR) for the three days around the filing of the waiver (file date),
the report of the waiver prior to filing (report date), and the date
that the action triggering the waiver occurs (event date). In Panel
B we split the waivers into those that are filed alone (lone disclo-
sure) and waivers that are accompanied by some other material
event in the 8-K (simultaneous disclosure). We reported the CAR
for the three days around the filing date only in Panel B.
Type of Waiver Filed 8-Ks CAR -file CAR - CAR -date report date event date
Panel A
Blackout 5 -3.1% 1.4% -0.5%
Transactions [51 [5] [5]
Interlocking 7 -1.2% 3.7% 6.7%
Positions [5] [5] [5]
Personal 4 -1.1% -4.0% -2.9%
Investments [41 [41 [4]
Related-party 5 1.2% -2.8% -3.8%
Transactions [5] [5] [5]
Other 4 3.2% -1.6% -1.6%
[41 [4] [41
Wealth 11 -0.7% 1.0% 1.0%
Transfers [7] [7] [7]
Total 36 -0.4% -0.1% 0.0%
[30] [30] [30]
Panel B
Simultaneous 19 -2.3%*
Disclosure [14]
Lone 17 1.3%
Disclosure [16]
. represents a statistical difference
5% level
between simultaneous and lone at the
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D. Price Evidence on Waivers
For each of the 29 firms that filed waivers, we examined the ab-
normal return to the firm's shareholders around the filing of the
Form 8-K that contains the waiver to the firm's ethics code. We
were unable to find price data for firms on five of the 36 filing
dates. Also, the Marvell Technology Group filed two waivers on
the same day, which are both classified as wealth transfers in Table
IX. Thus, we reported only one abnormal return associated with
these two waivers. This process leaves 30 waivers for the analysis.
The abnormal return we examined is the cumulative abnormal
return (CAR) to the firm from the day before to the day after the
date of interest (days -1, 0, and +1 where 0 is the day of interest)
minus the cumulative return on those same days of a value
weighted index of all firms in CRSP. In Panel A, the third column
of Table V, we reported CARs around the date that the waiver is
filed with the SEC. The three-day average abnormal return around
that date is a statistically insignificant -0.5%, and the range of these
abnormal returns is -12.2% to 10.3%. This means that the market
did not react to these waivers in a statistically significant way. Fur-
ther, when we examine returns within each subcategory, we find
that no subcategory is significantly different from zero at 5% sig-
nificance or less.
We also examined returns around the date a report is generated
within the firm (column four) and the date that the event which
triggered the waiver filing occurs (column five). In all but four
cases, the date the report is generated within the firm is at least one
day earlier than the actual filing date. Thus, we re-ran our analysis
from column three using this new report date. We found that both
the entire sample CAR and the sub-sample CARs are not different
from zero. So, it appears either that there is no leakage of informa-
tion, or that, if there is, the information is not important to share-
holders.
For 25 firms, the Form 8-K reports an event date on which the
waiver occurred. It is reasonable to assume that some market par-
ticipants knew about the waiver on the date it actually occurred
rather than the date of the filing. Therefore, we also examined the
abnormal return using this new date, keeping the original filing
date for one firm for which we could not find an event date. In col-
umn five, the average CAR using the event date is 0.0%. These re-
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sults suggest that, on average, waivers to codes of ethics are not
bad news to investors.
Finally, we examined transactions based on whether there is si-
multaneous disclosure of another event (for example, a simultane-
ous merger announcement alongside a waiver of a particular direc-
tor of the bidder owning stock in the target). One view of the
timing of the filing of waiver information is that particularly bad
waiver filings may be coupled with other information in order to
distract investors. A more generous view is that waivers are filed as
they are approved. In Panel B of Table IX, we present evidence
that suggests that these disclosures are coupled with other informa-
tion about half of the time-14 filings are simultaneous with some
other non-waiver event and 16 filings are not accompanied by any
other information in the Form 8-K. Interestingly, the filings made
alongside some other disclosure are associated with -2.3% abnor-
mal returns to shareholders; this reduction in shareholder wealth is
significantly different from zero at the 10% level. Further, non-
simultaneous waiver filings are associated with a statistically insig-
nificant abnormal return of 1.3%. These two returns are signifi-
cantly different from each other at the 5% level. This result is con-
sistent with firms attempting to hide particularly bad news in the
context of the filing of a waiver by coupling it with other news.
For robustness, we examined the abnormal returns at the time of
the filing in a multivariate setting. In this setting, we controlled for
simultaneous filings using a binary variable equal to one if the
waiver is simultaneously filed by the firm along with other informa-
tion and zero otherwise. We included this binary variable because
firms may choose to disclose particularly bad waivers in concert
with other news for the reasons given above. We also controlled
for the market value of equity of the filing firm, because firm size is
a well-known proxy for risk; small firms are riskier than large firms.
Finally, we controlled for the reason for the waiver (for example,
violation of blackout period, related-party transaction, etc.) using a
series of binary variables. We determined significance levels of the
coefficients using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors
with a small sample adjustment.154
15 See generally James G. MacKinnon & Halbert White, Some Heteroskedasticity-
Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimators with Improved Finite Sample Properties, 29
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We found that the only significant independent variables are the
indicator variable for simultaneous filings, with a negative coeffi-
cient, and the size variable, with a positive coefficient. This result
confirms the univariate findings that firms may hide bad news by
coupling it with other news. We are hesitant to conclude much
from the significance finding for the size variable, given the general
nature of disclosure practice in small firms."' Lastly, because none
of the binary variables that describe the reason for the waiver are
significant, it appears that the market does not view a particular
type of waiver-worthy behavior as systematically worse than the
others. This multivariate analysis, however, must be taken with
some healthy skepticism given the very small sample size.
In some sense, our results mirror studies of the "comply-or-
explain" governance approach taken by regulators in Canada, the
United Kingdom, and the European Union."' Under this regime,
firms must either comply with a regulator-supplied list of best prac-
tices for corporate governance or explain the reason for noncom-
pliance."' Most empirical analyses of comply-or-explain govern-
ance structures conclude that complying firms do not outperform
noncomplying firms."'
Yet it would be wrong to conclude from our results that the mar-
ket is indifferent to ethics waivers if, in fact, they were reported as
Congress envisioned when it enacted SOX. As Section I.B makes
clear, many transactions that should rightly be disclosed as waivers
are not being reported. Indeed, we posit that most companies only
report waivers that do not reveal negative information. We cannot
conclude from the current waiver survey that the market would be
indifferent to ethics waivers if firms honored both the letter and
spirit of Section 406. To do so would be as if the IRS were to an-
nounce amnesty for all tax evaders, receive amnesty requests from
J. Econometrics 305 (1985); Halbert White, A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covari-
ance Matrix Estimator and a Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity, 48 Econometrica 817
(1980).
" Because they tend to disclose less, any release of information can affect small-
firm price, unlike a large firm such as Microsoft that can make multiple SEC filings
every day.
' Sanjai Bhagat, Brian Bolton & Roberta Romano, The Promise and Peril of Cor-
porate Governance Indices, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 1803, 1863-64 (2008).
Id. at 1864.
Id.
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only 100 taxpayers, none of whom owe more than $1,000, and con-
clude that no large-scale tax evasion exists in the United States.
The wide range of transactions that give rise to waivers of codes
of ethics-together with the very small number of observations of
waiver reporting and the sporadic nature in which the codes of eth-
ics themselves are reported (or not)-is instructive. It seems that
the only systematic conclusion possible from our findings is that
the code of ethics is either effective medicine or placebo. We con-
clude the latter.
One example is particularly helpful in expressing our view. On
November 6, 2006, Global Telecom & Technology adopted a code
of ethics and on November 8, 2006, filed a waiver from the code.
The 8-K states that:
The Company's Chairman of the Board and Executive Chair-
man, H. Brian Thompson, currently serves on the boards of di-
rectors of Comsat International, Inc., Sonus Networks, Inc. and
Bell Canada International, Inc[.], each a communications com-
pany and potentially a competitor of the Company. In light of the
fact that Mr. Thompson's relationships with such potential com-
petitors existed prior to the adoption of the Code, the Board of
Directors of the Company determined that Mr. Thompson's ser-
vice on these other boards of directors would not interfere with
the performance of his duties with the Company.'59
According to this filing, the board deems certain behaviors un-
ethical, including service of directors on boards of potential com-
petitors. The current chairman clearly violates Global's code of
ethics, but because he engaged in the problematic conduct both be-
fore and after the company adopted the ethical code, his behavior
is deemed acceptable. Though this statement by the board is illogi-
cal at best, the board nonetheless goes on to waive this behavior.
The Global Telecom & Technology waiver underscores the seem-
ingly nonsensical and costly busywork that requiring a corporate
code of ethics represents.
"' Global Telecomm. & Tech., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 2-3 (Nov. 8,
2006) (announcing ethics code and providing for waiver).
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CONCLUSION
A. Ethics Disclosure
Our findings suggest that the current regime is a bad one, long
on burdensome disclosure (and internal decision-making about the
need to disclose) but short on demonstrable benefit. Whether we
should do away with the disclosure requirement or provide guide-
lines for more detailed ethics disclosure is an open question. As a
preliminary matter, we suggest that companies not be allowed to
claim that they have a code of ethics if their code does not forbid
related-party transactions. As described in Part III, the board's ac-
ceptance of Enron's related-party transactions was what led to Sec-
tion 406's waiver disclosure provision in the first place. To call
something that permits such behavior a code of ethics is absurd in
light of the context within which SOX was written.
More fundamentally, we suggest eliminating the code of ethics
waiver requirements altogether. The ability of companies to "game
the system" by creating their own codes has led to weak codes and
empty disclosures. The tiny minority of companies that disclose
waivers save them for innocuous transactions, except when they
are bundled with other information. Instead, companies delay re-
vealing the more unsavory related-party transactions by disclosing
them only in year-end proxies, where they can be buried in the
rubble of sundry disclosures. Instead, we would require immediate
disclosure of related-party transactions involving the CEO, CFO,
and CAO on the theory that Section 406 was reasonable in pre-
suming that investors want to know about these transactions im-
mediately.
One might object that the related-party transaction threshold, a
mere $120,000, is too low, especially in the context of the operation
of a corporation with a market capitalization of billions of dollars.
But these transactions are significant not because of their actual
cost to the firm, but because they signal that agency costs may be
severe, and that the firm's officers may be intent on securing their
own benefits rather than honoring their fiduciary duties.
We argue that these changes will result in more meaningful, tar-
geted disclosures. Paul Mahoney has observed that the mandatory
disclosure regime might have developed specifically as a response
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to agency cost problems." He traced the history of the 1933 Securi-
ties Act, which was modeled on common law rules addressing cor-
porate promoters who would take secret fees or fail to disclose that
they owned the land being sold to the nascent corporation.16 Un
derstood in this light, our whole disclosure system is about reveal-
ing agency costs, not about enhancing accuracy of stock prices. A
renewed focus on the real and present agency cost problem thus re-
turns securities disclosure law to its roots and central concern.
B. Website Disclosure
Honoring specific congressional instructions, the SEC permitted
compliance with securities laws via website disclosure for the first
time in promulgating regulations pursuant to Section 406. Our re-
search demonstrates the perils of this approach. As researchers, we
dislike company website disclosure because it makes research
much more difficult. This type of research arguably makes markets
more efficient and provides monitoring of managers. The SEC's
EDGAR provides a reliable, consolidated database for study. In
contrast, website disclosure is unpredictable and there is no re-
quirement that companies keep such disclosure public. Indeed,
Viacom has now made it impossible to navigate to the waivers
from its Investor Relations page.162 The SEC itself only requires
disclosure "for at least 12 months." 163 After that, companies must
only "retain" the disclosure for at least five years." The SEC does
not discuss what good such an internally archived record of past
disclosure does the public. In fact, it does no good at all. When a
company files with the SEC, in contrast, the information is avail-
able forever.
The Viacom waivers illustrate the perils of permitting disclosure
by website alone. Viacom, after all, was able to pick and choose
which information it would disclose where. To the SEC, it dis-
60 See Mahoney, supra note 24, at 1048.
.61 Id. at 1056-60. Mahoney's article responded to the justification of mandatory se-
curities disclosure for the purposes of "accuracy enhancement," that is, ensuring that
a stock's publicly traded price accurately reflects all available information.
162See supra Section IV.D.
Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Form 8-K: General Instructions 17 (2008), available at
http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form8-k.pdf.Id.
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closed a material definitive transaction and only by website did it
disclose the required ethics waiver. Further, if the Viacom case is at
all representative, companies can misleadingly file waivers as "up-
dates," making it seem as if there has been only one waiver when
in fact there have been several.
Securities researchers are not the only ones misled. If, as we
have found, waivers need only be disclosed for twelve months,"
then an investor will not be able to look to a company's website in
order to determine whether a company engages in a pattern and
practice of granting waivers over the years. Also troubling is the
fact that our study found that in ten cases-5% of our sample-
companies claimed to be disclosing codes of ethics on their web-
sites even though no code of ethics could be found.
We conclude that permitting sole website disclosure is a bad
idea, period. If the SEC wants to go down the website disclosure
path, it should require dual disclosure-via website and SEC filing.
Dual disclosure would make information easier to access without
imposing significant additional costs on firms, which must generate
the disclosure statement either way. Allowing for sole website dis-
closure makes it harder to find information and provides no real
benefit to companies except to give them an opportunity to down-
play and disguise questionable transactions. The SEC could impose
standardized URLs, such as CompanyEthicsCode and Compan-
yEthicsWaivers, to ensure that the codes and waivers are easily ac-
cessible to the public, and require that such disclosures remain
public for at least five years. We are unaware of any other areas in
which the SEC permits sole website disclosure. This experiment
should end here.
C. The Limits of Unenforced Disclosure
Our study shows that requiring disclosure can only do so much.
How generalizable this insight is remains in question. Sarbanes-
Oxley did not provide a means of private enforcement for most of
its provisions.'" Courts have been reluctant to read a private cause
of action into the Act even in easily identifiable cases, such as
165 Id.
'6 Faith Stevelman, Foreword, Corporate Governance Five Years After Sarbanes-
Oxley: Is There Real Change?, 52 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 475,495 (2007-2008).
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where a firm may recover funds from executives following an ac-
counting restatement.16 Enforcement of Section 406's disclosure
requirements is therefore left to the SEC, but to date it has not in-
stigated a single enforcement action under Section 406. Our study
thus demonstrates the tremendous discretion the SEC has with re-
spect to enforcement priorities. It also suggests that the basic con-
sequence of underenforcement is the imposition of disclosure re-
quirements on paper that are ignored in real life.
We view Section 406's ethics waiver rules as "soft" disclosure: at
best these rules facilitate error; at worst they invite manipulation.
The combination of soft disclosure rules and non-enforcement
gives companies every incentive to disclose as little as possible.
Whether companies rely on an overly narrow definition of
"waiver" (as Mori posits), invoke the "material departure" limit
(as the text of Section 406 permits), or game the system by failing
to include related-party transactions in their codes of ethics, com-
panies are evading the clear intent of the law. A "hard" disclosure
approach, under which a company must disclose any related-party
transactions of more than $120,000, appears to work better. Oth-
erwise companies can bend the rules to duck or delay incriminating
disclosures whenever possible.
Under a "benign" view, in contrast, a company's failure to dis-
close an ethics waiver under Section 406 may result from an honest
mistake. Companies may not be complying because they have not
set up systems to monitor their high-level officers' conduct and
raise red flags when the ethics code is violated. A "hard" disclosure
regime would reduce this risk as well. This is especially true be-
cause related-party transaction regulation has been around for
decades and companies already have established mechanisms in
place for identifying and reporting examples of the types of behav-
ior as to which we would mandate prompt disclosure.
This benign hypothesis has resonance for the recent financial cri-
sis. Educating all of the appropriate individuals within an organiza-
161 Section 304 provides that chief executive officers and chief financial officers must
forfeit their bonuses and trading profits if an accounting restatement reveals that,
through misconduct, a company's financial statements were inflated. See Allison List,
Note, The Lax Enforcement of Section 304 of Sarbanes-Oxley: Why is the SEC Ignor-
ing Its Greatest Asset in the Fight Against Corporate Misconduct?, 70 Ohio St. L.J.
195, 200-06 (2009).
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tion and developing controls and systems for disclosure may be a
difficult but crucial step in implementing any new disclosure regu-
lations if they are to succeed. But without enforcement, compliance
levels will probably be low.
Our findings demonstrate the perils of attempting to regulate
substantively while still purporting to respect corporations' auton-
omy. Investors are lulled by the false appearance of ethics regula-
tion, when in reality ethics rules are both diluted and flouted.
